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Abstract 
’ Smuggling is active after China has started its 
economics reforms. Smuggling becomes rampant with growing 
demand for foreign goods in China. It erodes the trade 
barriers and therefore disturbs China's development 
strategy. Effort is spent by the state in the fight 
against smuggling. However, smuggling does not vanish in 
•- .. 
the long term. It seems that smuggling is- unavoidable. 
Smuggling is an underground activity. Individual 
researchers have no direct access to its data. Estimations 
for its volume and costs are needed for the empirical 
study on it. From Simkin's idea, smuggling volume can be 
estimated by comparing the imports demand and the recorded 
imports. Moreover, the types of smuggled goods can also be 
identified by this method. 
Hongkong provides costs advantage to smugglers. Thus 
goods are frequently smuggled into Mainland China through 
Hongkong. Since Hongkong is the major channel for 
smuggling in China, the empirical study concentrate on the 
impacts of this smuggling to China. 
Smuggling incurs loss to the economy as it is an 
unproductive profit-seeking activity. On the other hand, 
it is beneficial to the private sectors in the economy by 
eroding trade barriers. The gain and loss from smuggling 
is compared under Pitt's framework. A method for welfare 
analysis is suggested in this thesis such that the 
empirical works involved can be greatly simplified. Due to 
‘the lack of data, only smuggling of television sets is 
studied here. However, as television sets is a major 
smuggled commodity, the welfare impact of smuggling 
televisions sets plays an essential role in concluding 
about the welfare implication from smuggling. 
From the welfare analysis, smuggling televisions sets 
into China seems to be harmful to China's economy. 
However, due to the changing demand patterns in China, the 
construction of the imports demand function, which is 
essential in finding the gain from price disparity, is 
rather ad hoc. Nevertheless, this study provides an 
illustrative example for welfare analysis. The empirical 
result here can be used as a reference for analysis on 
smuggling. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The cause of smugrgling 
Smuggling is traditionally regarded as an illegal and 
immoral activity. Its occurrence, is due to the restriction 
on trade imposed by the government. As we know, exchange 
can make the parties involved better off. However, it is 
not necessarily beneficial to the whole economy. Some of 
the commodities traded may be harmful to the economy if 
the trade volume is excessive. In economics term, the 
commodities traded have negative externality. Common 
examples are drugs and fire arms which are essential for 
the economy. However, they should be governed or 
monopolized by the authority. Otherwise, if these goods 
can be freely purchased in the private sector, they will 
be abused in such a way that society will be in chaos. 
Therefore, conflicts of interests exist between the 
private and the public sectors,. Smuggling is then used by 
the private sector to overcome the barriers of trade for 
private interests. Even though the control from the 
government may not be correct, smuggling is a challenge to 
the authority. Therefore, evading the control of the 
government and carrying out this underground economic 
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activity should be dealt with and suppressed. 
With the accumulation of knowledge, people become 
less prejudiced and find that smuggling may have positive 
effect on the economy. The major argument is that the 
control on trade may be due to the ignorance of the people 
or the protection of the privileged class. Smuggling can 
promote free trade and correct such distortion so that the 
economy can be better off. Thus they blame protectionism, 
rather than smuggling, as the origin of immorality. 
Not withstanding the conflicts of interests between 
classes in an economy, trade barriers may be beneficial to 
the economy. For developing countries, trade barriers are 
mainly used to protect its growing infant industry from 
competition with products of developed countries. For a 
developed country which is a sufficiently large economy, 
imposing trade barriers can alter the terms of trade so 
that the welfare of the economy can be maximized. If 
restricted trade can -function to achieve the above 
objectives, smuggling is obviously a welfare losing 
activity for the economy. However, due to the rigidity of 
government bureaucracy, the government may not respond in 
time to the changing economic environment. When the tariff 
imposed is out dated and the original goal cannot be 
reached, smuggling may enrich the economy by breaking down 
the tariff. In this sense, smuggling may contribute to the 
economy by correcting the development strategy. 
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From the above two counter view points, it is 
doubtful that whether smuggling is beneficial to the 
economy. In spite of the long history of smuggling, 
economics analysis about smuggling was only recently began 
by Bhagwati and Hansen (1973)• Their analysis focused on 
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the costs incurred from smuggling and the impact that 
smuggling makes on domestic prices. Here the costs do not 
correspond to the welfare loss as stated above since 
Bhagwati & Hansen had treated the tariff imposed as non-
optimal to the economy. The “costs" means the additional 
resources used in smuggling to hide this illegal activity 
from detection by the government which is an unproductive 
profit-seeking activity. Tariff and quantitative 
restriction are the major tools for imposing barriers of 
trade to control foreign trade. Both of them will directly 
lead to the distortion of domestic prices. Smuggling can 
increase the trade volume and reduce the effect on 
domestic price by trade barriers. Their welfare 
implication then focused on this opposing effect of 
smuggling. Employing their analysis as a foundation, this 
thesis attempts to use the case of smuggling between China 
and Hongkong as a study to investigate the welfare 
implication of smuggling. ^ 
In China, smuggling has become a severe problem in 
recent years. It is not surprising for a developing 
country to have smuggling. Moreover, since Mainland China 
has been a closed economy for thirty years, smuggling 
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would not have been a strange phenomenon. But after the 
Party Third Plenum that determined to adapt economic 
reforms, increased international trade has become a 
consequence of the open-door policy. It should be expected 
that smuggling will be reduced since the restriction on 
imports has been released. However, there is significant 
rise of smuggling reported, partly because the national 
income of China has been increasing sharply after China 
has adopted the economic reforms. Another reason is the 
decentralization of the trade regime. Before the 80's, 
imports were limited, especially for consumer goods. With 
the possession of foreign goods being rare and the chances 
of being detected high, smuggling became a more difficult 
activity. With the liberalization of imports restrictions, 
many foreign goods that could be rarely purchased become 
available in domestic markets in China. This can 
facilitate smuggling by reducing the chance of being 
detected. 
A brief description of smuacrlina between Hong-kong- and 
China 
The smuggled imports of Mainland China originated 
mainly from the demand for products of developed countries 
which are far away from China. As smuggling must occur 
through the border of a nation, neighbouring countries of 
China must be involved in 弧 u g g l i n g as an intermediaries. 
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These countries are divided into two groups. One is the 
inland underdeveloped countries that border China. The 
other is the coastal countries. Smuggling is detected in 
the former frontiers. Goods traded this way consists 
mainly of the domestic primary products of these 
countries. Impact of this type of smuggling is around the 
border areas and is insignificant in volume to the whole 
country. Because of poor transportation condition in these 
areas or their being closed economies, products from 
developed countries are seldom smuggled into China through 
these avenues. 
On the other hand, smuggling from sea becomes the 
remaining possible way for large scale smuggling. Few 
smuggling routes with low costs and low risks are 
available for the smugglers if the products are directly 
transported from the countries of origin to China by sea. 
Places located near Mainland China and near the coast will 
best serve as bridgeheads for smuggling. Foreign goods are 
imported into this places legally and then smuggled into 
the coastal areas of China nearby so that the risks and 
the costs can be minimized. Hongkong, Macau and Taiwan are 
examples of this latter areas when accounting for physical 
distance. Under the special economic and political 
conditions of Hongkong, apart from being a gateway of 
legal external trade for China, Hongkong is also a 
convenient bridgehead for smuggling. Thus it is not 
surprising that smuggling activities between Hongkong and 
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China have existed for a long time. 
Starting from the 50's, when the United Nation 
imposed trade embargo on Mainland China after China had 
joined the Korean War, the smuggling of strategic supplies 
from Hongkong into Mainland China was encouraged by-
Chinese officials. After this patriotic campaign of 
smuggling, smuggling was continued by individuals 
engagement. With the sustained low growth of the economy 
and the frequent political movements, the smuggling volume 
is believed to be small. After the Cultural Revolution and 
economic reforms at a later time, smuggling was found to 
be active again. The smuggling of antiques, gold and 
herbal medicine out of Mainland China was aimed at earning 
foreign exchange. In return, watches, electrical consumer 
goods of portable sizes and low prices were popular 
commodities to be smuggled into China. Later, with growing 
domestic exports under limited exports channels, many 
goods, especially those produced in the Special Economics 
Zones, were exported to Hongkong by bypassing the legal 
channel (the state owned FTCs)• In return was the illegal 
imports and/or foreign exchange. This condition lasted 
until 1985 . The inflationary "pressure and massive trade 
deficit led to the determination of the authority to cool 
down the overheated economy. Large effort was put into 
anti-smuggling. In 1986, this type of smuggling activities 
had been restrained. 一 
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1988 seemed to be a turning point in smuggling. With 
the third reform drive in China, the trade regime was 
further decentralized and the retention rate of foreign 
exchange of domestic enterprise was raised.^ Smuggling 
became active again. But contrast to the environment 
before 1986, smuggling activity were mainly carried out in 
one direction only. Goods were frequently smuggled into 
China while illegal exports from China decreased. Smuggled 
goods were paid for by foreign earnings from tourism, 
remittances, and inward foreign direct investment. The 
major smuggled items were expensive electrical appliances, 
tobacco and automobiles. These products were not made in 
Hongkong, but were imported. Moreover, illegal goods such 
as drugs and firearms were also increasingly smuggled into 
Hongkong from China. With the free trade policy in 
Hongkong, imports and exports are not subject to tariff. 
This tariff-free status gives smugglers a cost advantage. 
(Pai Shina Semi-Monthlv 1991:239, pp.30-31) 
Smuggling from Hongkong to China is mainly by sea. 
The popular places for goods delivery are Tai 〇 and the 
areas around Tolo Channel. Figures stated by the smugglers 
show that approximately seven thousand television sets and 
similar numbers of video recorders are transported from 
the urban areas to Tai O per month. By high speed boats or 
fishing boats, goods are s觀ggled to the southeastern 
coastal areas of China such as Guangdong or Fujian. More 
iSee Sung (1991a). 
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than forty market-places for smuggled goods are found in 
these provinces. In the peak period, the value of smuggled 
goods per day has reached ten million HK dollars. (Miner Po 
September 26, 1991 and Next Macrazine 1990:12) 
However, in response to the severity of the problem 
of smuggling, both the Chinese and Hongkong governments 
have carried out extensive anti-smuggling operations. As 
a result, smuggling was suppressed in 1991. But this does 
not last long and smuggling soon became active again. In 
•February 1994, Hongkong Customs discovered a smuggling 
case of largest value since the colonization of Hongkong. 
The value of seized goods was found to be around two 
hundred millions Hongkong dollars. 
We find that after 1986, the major trend of smuggling 
is the increased smuggling of foreign products into China 
to satisfy increasing demands while Hongkong acts as a 
channel for smuggling. The analysis will then focus on the 
impact of these illegal imports in China welfare, whether 
it has beneficial or harmful effect for China's economy. 
so far we have only considered the illegal trade 
whose purpose is to bypass the trade barrier. However, 
another form of illegal trade practice exists in China 
trade. This is the misinvoicing of exports and/or imports. 
The motivation of this type of illegal trade is different 
from smuggling. 
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In China, foreign exchange earned through exports 
must be turned over to the central government. The 
hoarding demand of foreign exchange under the strict 
control from the state creates strong incentives for the 
enterprise to misreport their trade volume so that part of 
the foreign exchange earned can be retained secretly for 
payment of imports, including smuggled goods. Misinvoicing 
can thus further induce smuggling. 
Outline of this study 
Therefore, the empirical works of my thesis will be 
mainly composed of two parts： 
1) Estimation of the illegal trade volume 
As illegal trade is a kind of underground economy, no 
statistical figures can be provided publicly to give a 
full picture of it. Estimations of these figures are then 
required. The two main illegal trade practices, smuggling 
and misinvoicing, are operated by different means. Since 
smuggling bypasses the legal channel of trade, its trade 
volume is completely missing in China's official records 
except for seized goods. Misinvoicing, by definition, will 
go through legal trade channels, though the value of trade 
is misrecorded. Thus we should estimate their respective 
volumes separately. 
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A direct way to obtain a rough view on smuggling is 
to obtain the data provided by the police or Customs. 
However, the data is inadequate as only the volume of 
confiscated goods is reported. On the other hand, we can 
know the categories of commodities that are frequently 
smuggled to Mainland China. As not all the exported/re-
exported goods to China will involve smuggling, it is 
vital to identify the smuggled goods. Another method for 
identification is to plot the retained imports in Hong 
Kong against time.' It they are increasing surprisingly 
during presenting years, we can suspect that the extra 
increase is due to the smuggling activity. 
After the smuggled goods are identified, the 
smuggling volume will then be estimated. The retained 
imports are compared with the consumption demand in Hong 
Kong. If the recorded retained imports are significantly 
larger than the consumption demand in Hongkong, the 
differential should be the missing recorded amount of re-
exports of Hongkong. It is assumed to be only caused by 
smuggling from Hongkong to China. The differential will 
then be the estimate for smuggled volume. By this method, 
the first step is to estimate the consumption demand 
function. Since Hong Kong is an open economy, we can 
estimate the demand function without considering the 
supply side if world prices are exogenous (i.e., we assume 
that Hong Kong is a small economy) . It is obvious that 
smuggling becomes serious after Mainland China has adopted 
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the open-door policy. Thus, using past data, the various 
individual commodity consumption demand in Hong Kong can 
be estimated. Then by comparing the predicted quantity 
demand with the retained imports and/or domestic outputs 
net of exports, we can trace out the estimate of smuggling 
volume. 
For the misinvoicing of imports/exports, we can 
simply compare the trade statistics between Mainland China 
and Hong Kong. Those commodities with significant 
differences in trade values (after accounting for f.o.b. 
values for Hongkong exports to China and c.i.f. values of 
China imports from Hongkong) provided by the official 
statistics of the two places can give strong evidence of 
the existence of these activities after taking 
transportation costs and insurance costs into account. The 
approximate value of misinvoicing can thus be obtained. 
This works has already been presented by S.C. Fung (1987) 
in which the data are provided up to 1986 and only the 
exports of China to Hongkong is covered. Some observations 
about the methodology of estimating misinvoicing are 
suggested in this thesis. 
2) Welfare analysis and implication 
Comparing with misinvoicing of import/export, 
smuggling incurs much higher costs as there are real 
resources input into the smuggling activities which are 
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unproductive. On the other hand, smuggling can circumvent 
the trade barriers. If the trade barriers is not optimal 
for the economy, it will be beneficial if domestic prices 
are lowered by the increasing inflow of foreign goods 
through illegal channels. Thus, the measurement of social 
gain/loss is mainly concentrated on the smuggling 
activity. The two opposing effects of real resource costs 
and domestic price disparity which jointly determine the 
net gain or loss to the economy will be analyzed so as to 




The pioneering study on smuggling by economics 
analysis is the works of Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) . Under 
the traditional two . traded goods model, smuggling is 
considered to be a directly unproductive profit-seeking 
activity which is represented by a transformation curve 
less favourable than the terms of trade. This implies that 
smuggling, will incur real resource costs (i.e., some 
smuggled goods are lost in the process of smuggling or the 
total real costs are accounted for in terms of smuggled 
commodities) to the small economy. On the other hand, the 
domestic prices of the economy may be lowered from tariff-
included price by eroding the trade barriers imposed, so 
that the economy is better off. Different assumptions of 
the market structure and nature of the costs of smuggling 
(here meaning that whether the costs are increasing or 
constant) have different welfare implications. It is found 
that only when legal trade is-'completely eliminated by 
smuggling so that price disparity occurs will there be a 
chance for welfare improvement. When legal trade coexists 
with smuggling, the welfare of the economy must be worsen. 
Based on Bhagwati and Hansen's works, Falvey (1978), 
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Pitt (1981) , Martin and Panagariya (1984) , and Thursby, 
Jensen and Thursby (1991) further analyzed the welfare 
implication with some modifications and/or border 
consideration. 
In Falvey (1978), quantitative restriction on imports 
is considered instead of tariff rate. As imports premium 
is captured by the importers rather than by the 
government, price disparity as a result of smuggling will 
only reduce their rent. In consideration of 
competitiveness, legal trade always has the advantages of 
lower costs (since the world price is always lower than 
the domestic prices) when comparing with domestic output 
and/or costs involving smuggling. Smuggling will only 
compete with higher-cost domestic outputs. It is an 
reinforcement to imports rather than a replacement to 
legal trade. Thus increasing the availability of imported 
goods with lower domestic price can always lead to welfare 
improvement. 
In Pitt (1981), legal goods have external effect 
which can lower the costs of smuggling by their camouflage 
effect on smuggling. Then, there will be room for legal 
trade when there is price disparity. Coexistence of legal 
trade and smuggling will no longer necessarily be welfare 
worsening. 
In Martin and Panagariya (1984), based on Pitt, with 
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the factors of risks and uncertainty taking into account 
of smuggling, the effects of enforcement, tariff and world 
price are analyzed. Vigorous enforcement can lead to the 
reduction of share of smuggling in total trade but the 
impact on welfare is ambiguous. Raising the tariff rate 
will decrease the legal trade and welfare must be reduced. 
For changes in world price, the share of smuggling in 
total trade and the average costs of smuggling are 
constants. 
Thursby, Jensen and Thursby (1991) further extend the 
works of Martin and Panagariya. Market structure of the 
products is introduced in their study. In Pitt, firms must 
be engaged in both smuggling and legal trade. No firms can 
survive if they are only engaged in legal trade. TJT 
allows that firms will face different risk costs and have 
monopolistic power in the domestic market. With the 
domestic market becoming more competitive and more firms 
participate in foreign trade, welfare will be improved. 
In contrast to Bhagwati and Hansen, Sheikh (1974) 
treats the costs as consumption of primary resource 
instead of melting ice assumption as suggested by the 
former. Then smuggling will induce the same situation as 
immiserizing growth which will change the PPF of the 
economy. Again, coexistence of legal trade and smuggling 
is possible under welfare improvement. 
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Simkin (1970), Richter (1970) and Cooper (1974) had 
assessed the problems of detection of the smuggling 
volume. Two main methods of detecting unrecorded trade are 
suggested by Simkin (1970) . One is to compare the trade 
partner countries statistics on trade with their own 
official data on trade. The other method is to estimate 
the normal trade volume which represents the actual trade 
volume and then compare the recorded value so as to trace 
out the amount of illegal (in the sense that the official 
channel is bypassed) trade. Richter (1970) points out the 
practical problems in employing these methods. Cooper 
(1974) studies the market impact of smuggling in Indonesia 
by comparing the effective rate of protection (i.e. the 
ratio of domestic price to world price) to the nominal 
rate of protection for various types of imported goods. 
Commodities with high nominal rate of protection is found 
to have their effective rate of protection far below the 
ad valorem tariff rate. This shows that high tariff rate 
induces enough revenue from smuggling to cover its costs. 
Nature of the smugglina costs 
The private costs 
When discussing about smuggling, the costs related to 
smuggling may involve different meanings.— There exist 
private costs and social costs of smuggling. For those 
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smugglers, their costs include the followings： 
a) the purchasing cost which is the cost used to buy the 
foreign goods from the international market. Thus, the 
unit cost of purchasing will then be the free trade world 
price.1 
b) the operation costs which are the costs used for hiding 
the smuggling activities from the government detection. 
These costs include： 
i) the bribe which is only a kind of transfer between the 
economy. 
ii) other resources costs used to cover the illegal 
action. Some factors input such as labour and capital will 
be involved in this unproductive activity. These includes 
the additional costs for smuggling when compared with 
normal legal trade. For example, the cost of employing 
high speed boats in smuggling is obviously higher than the 
normal transportation cost in legal trade. 
c) the expected penalty costs and its related risks cost 
which are the costs involved when the smuggling activities 
have the chance of being detected by the governments. The 
penalty costs consist of the smuggled goods seized by the 
iSince both the legal trade and smuggling require purchasing 
costs thrterm "smuggling costs- in the followxng paragraph will 
n S e c t this parts of smuggling costs except otherwise stated. 
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Customs and the subsequent penalty for committing 
smuggling, such as the loss of labour because the 
smugglers have been sentenced to jail or death, the 
destruction or forfeiture of the smuggling equipment and 
the fine for the crime. 
The social costs 
On the other hand, from the social point of view, the 
social costs account for the use of resources in this 
unproductive profit-seeking activities (i.e. excluding 
transfers such as bribes, fines, etc.). Furthermore, the 
externalities generated by smuggling are also considered 
as part of the social costs. Thus, the social costs 
include the following components：^ 
a) The erosion of moral standard in the economy will 
increase the transaction costs of other economic 
activities in the economy. Moreover, the induced 
enforcement of the law will lead to further attrition of 
resources. 
b) The reduction of government revenues which may lead to 
the cutback in supply of public goods. 
c) The distortion of optimal tariff due to the increase in 
the demand of foreign goods which leads to a less 
2see Johnson (1974). 
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favourable term of trade. Even though the above effect can 
be neglected for a small economy, smuggling can affect the 
aim of a tariff and this can be viewed as a kind of social 
costs. 
d) Part of the private costs should be included in the 
social costs, such as the purchasing cost and the resource 
cost. For the penalty costs, some of them are real loss. 
For example, because of the expected heavy punishment, in 
order to avoid being arrested, some smuggled goods may be 
damaged, destroyed or thrown into the sea by the smugglers 
before they are can be inspected. Moreover, except for the 
fine for smuggling, the punishment involves real loss. 
Goods are either seized by foreign customs or domestic 
customs. The former must be a loss. If the purpose of 
imposing tariff is to protect a domestic industry, the 
latter can also be viewed as a loss to the economy. 
By comparing the private costs and the social costs, 
we know that the private costs is not thoroughly a subset 
of the social costs. We cannot know which one is larger 
than the other one. Then, difficulty arises in the study 
of the welfare impact of smuggling. In the welfare 
analysis, we are only interested in the social costs of 
smuggling. However, in order to know the conditions about 
smuggling, we must study the smugglers' decision according 
to their profit maximizing behaviour so as to arrive at 
the market equilibrium which determine the welfare impact 
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of smuggling to the economy. Then private costs have to be 
considered. Relative to the private costs, the social 
costs are much more unmeasurable. If the private costs is 
used as proxy of the social costs, it is uncertain whether 
the social costs are understated or overstated. 
In the study by Bhagwati and Hansen and the 
succeeding works on theirs, social costs is only accounted 
when it is related to the economic efficiency of the 
smuggled commodities market. The social costs associated 
with the erosion of moral standard, government revenue 
reduction, opportunity costs of public goods and the 
distortion from optimal tariff are neglected. Then the 
remaining part of social costs that are taken into 
consideration will be the real resource costs directly 
involved in smuggling, which is part of the private costs 
of smugglers. Thus, apart from the part of private costs 
which is a transfer within the economy, the private costs 
can represent for the social costs. As a result, social 
costs becomes less than the private costs. We can conclude 
that the welfare implication made with this assumption 
will understate the social costs of smuggling. 
y 一 ’ 
Once the relationship between the private costs and 
the social costs can be clarified, then the relationship 
between the private smuggling costs and the scale of 
smuggling is discussed. Three possibilities may be present 
in the costs function of smuggling, i.e. increasing costs, 
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constant costs and decreasing costs. In fact, a costs 
function may compose of one or more of the above. But for 
simplicity, we assume that the costs function is simply a 
constant costs, a strictly increasing costs or a strictly 
decreasing costs. In all cases, zero fixed cost is 
assumed. 
Notice that here we are discussing about the industry 
costs of smuggling. The industry costs already internalize 
all the intra-industry externalities. For constant costs 
industry, each additional unit: of smuggled goods will 
require the same costs as the previous output. Therefore 
the costs of one's goods will be independent of the other. 
This shows that no intra-industry externality exists in 
this industry. Then the profit maximization decision of 
individual smuggler will be identical to that of the 
smuggling industry since private marginal costs will be 
equal to industry marginal cost. 
For strictly increasing costs function (with zero 
fixed cost), the industry marginal costs is always larger 
than the industry average costs except when the output 
level is zero. This shows that there is intra—industry 
externalities among the producers. It is because when the 
industry marginal costs is equated to price, profit will 
not be zero which can be achieved only by monopolized 
industry. If the market is under perfect— competition, 
since zero profit must be made, nhe individual marginal 
21 
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costs must be equal to the individual average costs in 
market equilibrium. By neglecting outside industry 
externalities, the individual average costs will be the 
same as the industry average costs. Therefore, as the 
industry marginal costs is not equal to the average costs, 
the difference represents the intra-industry 
externalities. The industry average costs which is equal 
to the individual marginal costs will then determine the 
industry output level under perfect competition. (See Fig. 
2 .1) 
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When comparing with the assumption of constant costs, 
increasing costs is more convincing. It is because there 
are always externalities within the industry. Apart from 
pecuniary economy or diseconomy, when smuggling becomes 
more intensive regardless whether it is due to individual 
inc-reasing his smuggling activity or more people engaging 
in smuggling, the probability of being detected will 
increase. Moreover, the penalty for smuggling will 
CO讓only increase with increasing volume of seized goods, 
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including the fine for smuggling. Either more resources 
are needed to cover their illegal activities or the 
increasing expected penalty will lead to higher cost for 
each additional unit of smuggled goods. This increasing 
costs applies to all the smugglers whenever one of them 
desire to increase their smuggling volume. Nevertheless, 
constant costs is still possible in the case of 
nonexistence of intra-industry externalities. 
However, how about the case of strictly decreasing 
costs? As economy of scale cannot last forever for rising 
volume of output due to scarcity of resources, the costs 
will soon become increasing. Thus strictly decreasing 
costs can rarely occur. Moreover, even costs function may 
exhibit economy of scale. If the market is perfectly 
competitive, the output level must occur at the increasing 
costs region. Only when the smuggling industry is 
monopolized may the portion of decreasing costs appear in 
the decision range of output. 
Methodology of the empirical study 
The estimation for smuggling volume is mainly based 
on the ideas of "normal" exports from Simkin (1970) with 
little modification. Not only the smuggling volume but 
also the type of smuggled goods can be concluded. 
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The welfare analysis is based on Pitt's framework 
(1984) • This analysis is to investigate that whether 
smuggling is beneficial to the economy. The amount of gain 
or loss is not major concern of this study. As legal trade 
coexists with smuggling in China, the conclusion drawn 
about smuggling must be welfare worsening by smuggling in 
Bhagwati and Hansen's framework. Pitt's framework allows 
a possibility of welfare improvement by smuggling. If 
welfare worsening of smuggling is found under Pitt's 
framework, the conclusion can be more convincing. 
When Pitt's framework is compared with the frameworks 
of Martin and Panagariya (1984) , TJT (1991) or Sheikh 
(1974), it is much more simple for empirical analysis。 The 
works of Martin and Panagariya (1984) and TJT (1991) are 
the extensions of Pitt's works with little modification. 
The general equilibrium framework of Sheikh (1974) 
requires a complete study of all the factors and products 
markets in the economy. It seems impossible for an 
empirical study. Although Pitt's framework is also a 
“general equilibrium analysis, the two goods framework 
simplifies the empirical analysis. 
24 
Chapter 3 
The Actual Real Loss of Smugqlina 
In the studies about the welfare of smuggling, most 
of the efforts were concentrated on the impacts of pri-ce 
disparity on welfare from different theoretical setting. 
• • •；• 
The nature of costs of - smuggling was overlooked, 
especially the difference between the real resource costs 
and the costs faced by smugglers. In order to get a clear 
picture about smuggling, the relationship between the real 
resource costs and the costs faced by smuggler is an 
essential topic. 
The above literatures treated the industry costs of 
smuggling exactly the same as the social costs (real loss) 
of smuggling. But we know that at least part of the 
private costs is just a transfer rather than real loss. 
Only the resource costs can be viewed as a real loss to 
the economy. 
Resources are employed to facilitate the smuggling 
activities. With larger scale of smuggling, it seems that 
more resources are needed to reduce the effectiveness of 
detection from government. Again, the resource costs are 
only part of the private costs of the smuggling industry 
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and individual smugglers. In fact, if the resource have 
only little camouflage effect, the share of resource costs 
in private costs may not necessarily increase. A simple 
model is set up to find out the relationships between the 
resource costs and the private smuggling costs. 
Firstly, each unit of smuggled goods has a 
probability that will be seized by the customs. With 
larger smuggling volume, the marginal probability of being 
seized will also become larger. Since probability is at 
most equal to one, the marginal probability will be 
increasing with decreasing rate. On the other hand, with 
more resources engaged in smuggling, the probability will 
be reduced. Again, as probability cannot be negative, the 
effectiveness of decreasing the probability will decrease 
with increasing resources. Let the probability of s th 
unit of goods being seized be p(s,R) where R is the amount 
of resources used by the smugglers. It has the following 
characteristics： 
p {s = 0,R) = 0 0 < p{s,R) < 1 
P, > 0 P s s < 0 p,^ < 0 
〈 0 Pi^i? > 0 
P s 〉 0 and P33 < 0 represent the assumption that 
increasing smuggling volume will increase the marginal 
probability of being seized with decreasing rate since 
probability is always bounded by 1. PR < 0 and Prr > 〇 
represent the assumption that increasing the resources 
input can decreases the probability of being seized with 
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increasing rate such that the probability will never be 
smaller than zero, p^ ^ < 0 means that Increasing R can 
reduce the marginal probability] 
Let the total amount of smuggled goods be S. The 
expected amount of seized goods is S. 
(3.1) 5 = p (s.R) ds = F{S,R) 
Neglecting the purchasing costs, the maj or smuggling 
costs will be the penalty costs, G, and the resources 
costs, R. Besides the seized goods, P^S, the penalty costs 
include the additional penalty such as the fine for 
smuggling and/or the destruction of input factors for 
smuggling. Let them be represented by J(S). 
(3.2) J(S) = J( Pp (s,R)ds) 
-0 
It means that this additional penalty depends on the 
expected amount of seized goods 
Then the total smuggling costs will be TC. The 
smugglers will choose the correct amount of resources so 
as to minimize the total costs for each level of smuggling 
iThis type of probability can be best represented by a 
l o g i s t i c f u n c t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i m p l i c i t f u n c t i o n is u s e d to 
express the general idea. 
2in fact expected penalty is a better choice than penalty 
funct二 S S h d S e n d s』 t h e -pecte^se.zed =•-二^。二二 "s 
risks is not taken into account, the latuer s runcc 
much simpler than the former. 
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volume. 
min TC = P^ S + J{S) + R 
R 
=G{S,R) + R 
where G{S,R) = pf s + J{S) 
(For simplicity, we let Pf = 1 and there is no 
additional penalty, J, such that the total penalty, 
G(S,R), is equal to the expected seized goods, F(S,R).) 
F.O.C. 
(3.3) dGiS Rn + 1 二 〇 
oR 
=> = -1 
s.o.c. 
G ^ > 0 
GR and GRR are negative as they are equal to FR and FRR 
respectively .3 Then both F.O.C. and S.O.C. can be 
satisfied. By totally differentiating the F.O.C. with 
respect to S, ' we can know the,direction of change of 
resources for cost minimization if smuggling volume, S, 
increases . 
3FR and FRR can be found by differentiating equation (3.1). 




=> G* + r* dR* ^ 
(3.4) => dR* _ G ; … 
_ _ � • 
dS^ ^ 
Where Z(S,R*) = 一 「r^* (r* ^r^* dR*、 
dS 
- G s r ( Gsrr + G^j^J^-^—)] 
Since G� R ( =PR) < 0 and G^^ 〉 0, resources always 
increases with smuggling volume. However, we cannot be 
sure whether it is increasing at an increasing rate, 
constant rate or decreasing rate. 
Furthermore, the response of the already minimized 
costs for each level of smuggling, C, to the changing 
smuggling volume can be found by differentiating it by S. 
C = G* + R* 
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dC 二 dG* + dR* 
— dS + dS 
=G* + + 巡 s R ds ds 
= （ 1 + Gl) > 0 
(3.5) = > 0 (... 1 + G; = 0) 
cPC = 些 
‘ 
(3.6) = 
(+) (-) (+) 
It is not strange to find out that dC/dS is larger 
than zero. Since the effect of the resource on decreasing 
the probability is always counter balanced by the resource 
costs (G*R*dRVdS + dR*/dS 二 0) , the marginal costs will 
then be the expected loss of the additional smuggled unit 
under new amount of resource. Besides, the slope of 
marginal costs is ambiguous. The only conclusion is that 
regardless of the sign of dRVdS (even though it must be 
positive, as shown before), the marginal costs is always 
positive. This means that the sign of marginal costs is 
independent of the second derivative of the penalty 
function G. (Recall equation 3.4.)" 
However, the marginal costs is found to be 
increasing only when G*ss is greater than -G%,*dR7dS. This 
implies that the direct effect of increasing the marginal 
probability by increasing smuggling is dominant on the 
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decreasing effect on marginal probability by the 
increasing resource. Therefore, we find that the marginal 
costs of smuggling is not necessarily increasing. 
So far the resources costs is considered to be the 
only real loss to the economy. If the private smuggling 
costs is treated as the only real loss to the economy, the 
real loss will obviously be overestimated. However, if the 
resources costs occupies larger and larger portion of the 
smuggling costs when smuggling volume increases to the 
extreme that R/C tends to be one (i.e. when S tends to 
infinity, R tends to equal to C) , the problem of 
overestimation can hopefully be minimized if we assume 
that smuggling occurs in large scale. 
If the share of R in C is increasing with respects to 
S, the following requirement must be satisfied. 
…*一…、diT ( dG* + dR、 
diR^/C) 一 (“幻 一 $ > 0 
dS 2 
/ \ dR* . J.. dG* 
< 二 > G 〉R 
This shows that there is no guarantee for increasing 
share of R in C. Further assumption about private 
smuggling costs is required. In fact, the penalty for 
smuggling is not entirely a transfer in the economy. 
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Firstly, not all of the seized goods are seized by 
domestic customs. There will be a loss to the domestic 
economy if the payment of the goods have been made by 
domestic smugglers (maybe we can treat it as the down 
payment) and the goods are seized by foreign customs. It 
is reasonable that if the volume of smuggling is very-
large , t h e down payment of the goods will also increases 
sharply such that the portion of real loss in seized goods 
will increase. 
Moreover, when the volume of seized goods is quite 
large, the goods may be destroyed instead of being sold in 
the domestic market if the purpose of imposing tariff is 
to restrict the amount of imports rather than to collect 
revenue. Another way is to re-sell the goods in the 
international market at a lower price. In addition, seized 
goods may also represent the goods destroyed by the 
smugglers (such as dumping them into the sea) to avoid 
severe punishment before they are arrested. Thus with 
larger volume of smuggling, when smugglers sense that they 
will be arrested, real loss will then be involved. All of 
the above will raise the share of real loss in seized 
goods. 
Secondly, the punishment of smuggling may include 
death penalty. As a result, there will be permanent loss 
of labour factors in the economy. Even if the smugglers 
are only jailed, the opportunity of participation in 
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production is also lost for the economy. This concept of 
loss of labour is somewhat different from the concept of 
R because R only includes the loss of labour in this 
period but the former will account for the labour loss in 
the future. 
Therefore, when the above are considered as real 
loss, it is reasonable to assume that the share of R in C 
will increase with increasing smuggling. Nevertheless the 
problem of real loss overestimation still exists but its 
effect can be believed to be insignificant in our 
analysis. In the welfare analysis, the private smuggling 
costs is used to represent the real loss of smuggling. 
Comment on Government Policy 
The participants in the. smuggling tournament includes 
consumers, smugglers (and/or other legal trader) and the 
government- Most of the literatures study the behaviour of 
consumers and smugglers while the government response is 
always • neglected. The following is some efforts to 
investigate government behaviour in connection with 
smuggling. 
From the government's point of view, their aim is to 
maintain the tariff goal. This means that it would try its 
best to reduce smuggling. Under neo-classical theoretic 
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framework, trade barriers imposed always reflects the 
conflict of interests between the government and the 
private sectors. The government must employ measures to 
maintain the trade barriers in order to achieve non-
economic objectives or other long-term consideration (such 
as optimal tariff or protection of infant industry). 
Obviously, the best results for the government is the 
complete elimination of smuggling. In the struggle against 
smuggling, government has the ability to affect the 
smuggling costs. The higher the (marginal) smuggling 
costs, the lower will be the smuggling level. In fact, 
smuggling costs is affected by two components： physical 
factors and government intervention. Physical factors 
include geographic characteristics of the smuggling 
routes, technology of smuggling, etc.. They are exogenous 
to government decision and therefore are beyond the 
government control. As a result, the complete elimination 
of smuggling may not happen. 
Then the primary goal of government will adjust to 
the reduction of smuggling to an acceptable level. If 
t a r i f f - i n c l u d e d world price is^the target for domestic 
price, the government will not be willing to see the 
appearance of price disparity. Its second best choice will 
be the suppression of smuggling to avoid price disparity. 
in controlling the smuggling costs, resources must be 
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used by the government (Let it be R^) • The amount of 
resource needed to achieve government goal should be 
considered also. If maintaining the target price gets the 
first priority, the government has to set a cost schedule 
for smugglers that can maintain the target price. Then the 
government has to consider the amount of government 
resources, Rg. This means that the former is determined 
first. With the costs schedule for smuggling" already set, 
the government then minimizes resources to combat 
smuggling• Recall that we have let： 
(3.7) G{S,R) 二 pf S + J{S) 
=p ^F{S,R) + J{F{S,R) ) • 
Now the total expected penalty, G(S,R), is no longer 
equal to F(S,R). There are two ways for the government to 
intervene in smuggling activities. Apart from inputting 
more resource, R^, to increase the effectiveness of 
detection which directly affect the function F(S,R), the 
government can increase the penalty by raising the 
punishment in addition to seizing the illegal goods, i.e. 
J. Nearly no expenditure is needed for the government to 
establish punishment for smugglers when comparing with 
maintaining the effectiveness of detection. The government 
can adjust the components of G such that the resource, Rg, 
needed can be minimized. 
F u r t h e r m o r e , b e s i d e s the p r i m a r y g o a l of m a i n t a i n i n g 
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target price, and the secondary goal of minimizing the 
government resource, Rg, the government has the tertiary 
goal of minimizing the total amount of resource employed 
by smugglers. To achieve this goal, the components of the 
costs schedule for the smugglers, J and F, can be adjusted 
by the government within its ability to minimize the 
resources employed by smugglers if possible. 
To fight against smuggling, increasing the marginal 
costs of smugglers must reduce the smuggling volume. From 
equation 3.5, raising the effectiveness of detection such 
that the marginal probability of discovery of smuggled 
goods is raised will increase the marginal costs for 
smugglers. With higher marginal costs, smuggling must be 
reduced. Assume that there is no real loss to the economy 
in punishment as J only consists of the fine which is a 
transfer. If the marginal effect of resource on hiding 
smuggling is not altered, F/, the resulting reduction in 
the total amount of real resource used by the smugglers, 
R, will only be due to the reduction in smuggling volume. 
At each level of smuggling, the optimal choice of resource 
remains the same, since the F.O.C. (equation 3.8) is not 
affected. " 
(3.8) 二 p'Fr + 、2) 二 -1 
If t h e m a r g i n a l e f f e c t of r e s o u r c e is a l s o r e d u c e d (i.e. 
F/ becomes less negative), the optimal choice of resource 
used in each level of smuggling, R*, will fall (since F,, 
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> 0) . As a results, R, still decreases. 
〇n the other hand, increasing the marginal penalty of 
smuggling, , will give an ambiguous result about the 
real loss of the economy. Alt hough smuggling" voluine will 
fall as marginal costs rises, the optimal amount of 
resource used (R*) for each level of smuggling, will 
increase to avoid the heavy punishment. (Since with larger 
J"', the L. H. S. of equation is smaller than -1 if resource 
used unchange, meaning that the marginal benefit from 
resource is higher than the marginal costs of R.) 
Therefore, the resulting change in the total amount of 
resources used (R) is uncertain. 
In conclusion, increasing the effectiveness of 
detection will require more Rg but R will decrease. 
Increasing the punishment will not require resources for 
the government but R may increase or decrease. As a 
result, there may be conflicts in reducing government's 
resource and smuggler's resources. 
Decision choice for crovernment__if__smuggling_cm__^ 
completely eliminated 
In the case of complete elimination of smuggling, the 
trade policy can be maintained and the resource costs of 
the smugglers can disappear. The remaining problem is the 
construction of the potential costs schedule for the 
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smugglers by the government. Recall the two of way of 
combating smuggling, raising the effectiveness of 
detection and penalty. The former can be viewed as a ex-
ante costs for the economy (or fixed in respect to 
smuggling) to fight against smuggling. It is because the 
expenditure for law enforcement exists regardless of the 
existence of smuggling. However, even if the penalty, J, 
requires costs for the governments^, it can be viewed as 
ex-post costs for the economy. It is because it will 
become a real loss only when smuggling really exists. 
Based on their expectation of the heavy punishment, 
smugglers will stop their smuggling activities. Thus no 
real loss is involved in this way. Therefore, it will be 
wise for the government to raise the expected penalty of 
smuggling so as to eliminate smuggling. 
However, in reality, smuggling cannot be completely 
eliminated. This may be due to three major reasons. 
Firstly, the two ways (detection and penalty) are not 
perfect substitutes for each others. Heavy penalties must 
at least rely on a minimum level of effective enforcement 
of law. Penalty alone cannot incur costs on smugglers. 
Secondly, if the detection is not effective enough in 
raising costs, the penalty must become very severe. 
However, the limited liability of the smugglers lead to a 
4F〇r example, the expenditure in maintaining the prison. 
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limitation of the penalty. For richer smugglers, their 
opportunity costs will be very high. But for poorer 
smugglers, their costs of smuggling may have no changes 
when government increases the expected penalty. Under this 
situation, the enforcement of law relies on effective 
detection. 
• Thirdly, there may be limitation for the 
effectiveness of detection. A upper bound smaller than one 
may exists for the probability of being arrested. 
As stated above, there are limitations for punishment 
to be effective. Then the best strategy to completely 
eliminate smuggling will be to set the punishment to its 
limit. As there is no smuggling, we do not have to worry 
about the impact of penalty on the resources used by the 
smugglers, R. Only consideration is to minimize Rg by 
setting high penalty. Under the highest possible‘extent of 
punishment, the next step is to raise the effectiveness of 
detection. Thus - when there are exogenous impacts which 
lead to the reduction of effectiveness, the first 
government response is to raise the penalty to its limit, 
if possible. Then improvement of, detection effectiveness 
should follow. 
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Decision_choice_for government if smuaQlincr cannot be 
completely eliminated 
〇n the other hand, if smuggling cannot be completely 
eliminated, it comes back to the second best choice for 
the government objective. The government can choose a 
optimal level of intervention so that both the real loss 
and smuggling are minimized. But since suppressing 
smuggling always receive the first priority, the remaining 
choice for government is to adjust the components of 
smuggling costs to minimize the total real loss (both the 
resources used by government and smugglers) . Therefore, 
setting the highest possible punishment for the smugglers 
may not lead to minimization of real loss. (We have 
already shown that increasing the penalty , J, has 
ambiguous impact on R*.) 
Now, we assume that G is entirely real loss to the 
economy. This make no difference to the decision choice 
for government if smuggling can be completely eliminated. 
If smuggling cannot be avoided, increasing the marginal 
costs for smugglers to lower the level of smuggling, S, 
(the primary goal of government) must reduce the real loss 
(G+R) from smugglers as smuggling volume declines (since 
the private costs of smugglers is entirely a real loss 
now) • The only remaining decision choices (the secondary 
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goal of government) will be the minimization of R^.^ Again, 
the heaviest punishment is required. The tertiary goal of 
government disappears because the real loss from 
smuggling, (G+R) , is already determined by the level of 
smuggling. 
Chinese practice in combatincr smucfQling-
In China, the penalty for smuggling is very harsh. 
The maximum penalty for smuggling is death penalty. On the 
other hand, when the wealth or opportunity costs of 
smugglers increase, their affordable punishment in terms 
of wealth rises. Using fine as the only means of 
punishment will always require readjustment with the 
growth of the economy. Since the death penalty is always 
the maximum possible penalty, this has the advantage of 
its effectiveness automatically catching up with the 
raising of smugglers, opportunity costs. Thus with death 
penalty, no adjustment is required to suit the changing 
s m u g g l i n g e n v i r o n m e n t . T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e s o u r c e s u s e d b y 
the government for detecting smuggling at each level of 
smuggling is automatically minimized. 
g e 二 j e 二 t : 二 = e 二 
二二。？二？. Will 一 on 
their importance in government consideration. 
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However, there is still drawback in employing death 
penalty, other than humanitarian reason. Firstly, it is 
the only largest possible penalty. The exercise of this 
punishment will depend on the final judgement. Death 
penalty may not be the final punishment. Death penalty may 
not be the final punishment. Moreover, since smuggling has 
been existing for a long period in China, this implies 
that smuggling is rarely eliminated. The opportunity costs 
of smugglers remains to be very low. Thirdly, with better 
economic environment, the costs of death penalty in terms 
of wealth, J, adjust automatically, so as the marginal 
penalty, J' . Since it has been illustrated that with J' 
increases, the changing resources loss is ambiguous. This 
argument is valid only when death penalty is not viewed as 
a real loss. Otherwise, this makes no difference to the 
real loss from smuggling as both the punishment and the 
resource costs of smuggling is real loss to the economy. 
However, if there is excessive labor supply, there may be 
no other opportunities for the smugglers. Rather, they may 
commit other criminal activities. Thus, death penalty is 
not necessarily viewed as real loss to the economy in this 
case . 
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List of symbols 
S ： the total amount of smuggled goods 
S ： the expected amount of seized goods 
R ： the resources costs of smuggling 
J ： t h e a d d i t i o n a l p e n a l i t y f o r s m u g g l i n g 
p : the probability of s th unit of goods being seized 
pf ： the world price of the goods 
G ： the total penalty costs for smuggling 




The Estimation of the Illegal Trade Volume 
Between Hongkong and Mainland China 
In the empirical study about smuggling, one major 
problem is the invisibility of the smuggling activity. 
Data about the smuggling volume and the total costs of 
smuggling is only known to the smugglers. The only data 
provided officially to the public is the volume of 
smuggled goods seized by the customs which seems useless 
since it is only part of the smuggled goods. Thus, to 
complete the welfare analysis, the smuggling volume must 
be estimated. 
Estimation of Physical Smuacrling 
In Simkin (1970) , the estimation of the amount of 
rubber smuggled out of Indonesia was suggested by the 
construction of the function for "normal export”. "Normal 
- export" is the export of rubber according to the supply 
and demand condition while the recorded export is the 
e x p o r t t h r o u g h l e g a l c h a n n e l . If t h e " n o r m a l e x p o r t " is 
significantly larger than the recorded export, it is 
probably that smuggling exists and the differential will 
be most likely the smuggling volume. 
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To construct the "normal export“ function, it seems 
to require a lot of information about the domestic supply. 
But if the smuggling has only a short history, we can use 
the historical data of recorded export when smuggling has 
not yet appeared (or exists in small scale) to predict the 
normal export in the smuggling periods. Either a supply 
function for normal export or a time series of normal 
export can be used. By subtracting the recorded export 
from the forecasting value of the normal export, the 
differential can then act as the smuggling volume. 
After opening policy was adapted by Mainland China, 
foreign goods from various countries were smuggled into 
Mainland China. Now finding the smuggling volume will 
require the “normal import“ of China and the recorded 
import. Repeating the same method will find troubles. As 
China had been a closed and planned economy for a long 
time, the normal demand of foreign imports is quite 
difficult to be estimated. Thus, alternative method should 
be used for getting more satisfactory result. 
Hongkong is the major place for smuggling of foreign 
produced goods into China as Hongkong has the advantages 
of geographic proximity and free trade. Thus by simply 
importing foreign goods legally into Hongkong, smuggling 
can be c a r r i e d o u t . T h e r e f o r e , w e f i n d t h a t t h e i m p o r t s of 
Hongkong not only fulfil Hongkong demand but also the 
demand from China. Therefore, by estimating the normal 
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import demand of Hongkong and compare with the recorded 
import of Hongkong, the smuggling volume of foreign good 
can be estimated by their differentials.^ Since domestic 
product of Hongkong is rarely smuggled into China, the 
above calculated volume of smuggling can represent the 
majority of smuggling between Hongkong and China. 
Thus, the estimation method for smuggling can change 
a little bit. Instead of estimating the normal import for 
China, the normal import of Hongkong is estimated. Then 
the difficulties of estimating for China's normal import 
can be bypassed. In order to ensure above method to be 
valid, further assumptions are needed. 
1) Hongkong only provides channel for goods to be 
smuggled into China. This means that no good is smuggled 
to the other place, so that the difference between normal 
import and recorded import of Hongkong entirely represents 
the smuggling volume between Hongkong and China. 
2) Hongkong is a small economy such that its has no 
p o w e r t o i n f l u e n c e i n its te r m s of t r a d e . T h e r e f o r e , t h e 
unit value index of import can simply be viewed as the 
f r e e t r a d e p r i c e . M o r e o v e r , t h i s c a n e n h a n c e t h e n e x t 
a s s u m p t i o n t h a t H o n g k o n g r e l i e s o n i m p o r t s d u e to t h e 
a b s e n c e of d o m e s t i c i n d u s t r i e s . 
v o l u m e is in t e r m s of v a l u e , v a l u e - a d d e d 
of s m u g g l e r s s h o u l d b e i n c l u d e d in i t . 
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3) Import demand is derived from consumption. People can 
consume on foreign and domestic goods. Therefore, import 
d e m a n d is i n t e r - r e l a t e d t o c o n s u m p t i o n d e m a n d . C o n s u m p t i o n 
demand may even takes the place of import demand in the 
estimation of smuggling volume. However, there is great 
difficulty in estimating the consumption demand. To find 
out the differential in observed and predicted demand, 
domestic output volume, import volume and consumption 
demand are needed. There is no data provided for the 
consumption demand for each type of commodities. Moreover, 
the classification in domestic industrial statistics is 
incompatible to the trade statistics. So we must assume 
that the domestic output and foreign product are not 
perfect substitutes. This assumption can be supported by 
the fact that Hongkong is highly specialized in tertiary 
industry. The trade pattern is primarily inter-industry 
trade in nature. Moreover, most of the smuggled goods into 
China are not made in Hongkong. Using consumption demand 
will imply that domestic output in Hongkong with unknown 
share in smuggling volume is smuggled into China. 
In order to know the total volume of smuggling, the 
result may not be satisfactory if the estimation of the 
total amount of normal import of Hongkong is employed. It 
is because the data will be too aggregated that the 
contrast of the normal import and the recorded import may 
not be significant. Thus the estimation of the normal 
import should be specific on the types of imports which 
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aire suspected to have smuggling existed. This comes to the 
problem of the degree of detailness of classification in 
traded commodities. 
The trade data of Hongkong is classified according to 
the SITC system. With the digits of the code increase, the 
goods will be classified into more detail category. With 
more divided category, the estimated normal import will be 
more precise. But the number of category of goods also 
increases which will require much huge work. One more 
problem should be considered that whether the category of 
goods also is accompanied by their respective price data. 
Only the 1 digit SITC section provide the respective unit 
value index which can be used as the price data. For 6 
digits classification, both the trade quantities and the 
trade value in H.K. dollars are available. By dividing the 
latter by the former, the trade unit value can be known 
which can function as a proxy for their respective prices. 
For those classification in between 1 digit classification 
and 6 digits classification, only the trade value is 
available. Thus no relevant data about their prices is 
provided. 
Therefore, we start with estimating the normal import 
of the commodities which are classified by section in the 
SITC system. Although the trade data employed now is still 
too aggraegate, the estimation result is essential in two 
way. Firstly, eventhough the forecasting residuals may no,t 
48 
entirely be the smuggling amount, they can give an 
aprroximate upper boundary for the possible amount of 
s m u g g l i n g . S e c o n d l y , t h i s m e h t o d s e r v e s to f i n d o u t t h e 
smuggling pattern, i.e., which types of goods are the 
popular smuggled items. Thus, with the identification of 
the smuggled items, it can provide a stronger support to 
the good chosen for the welfare analysis in the following 
chapters. At this stage, we can then proceed to estimate 
for more finely classified commodities which have their 
data of quantity. 
For the classification of commodity by section, there 
are totally ten section range from 0 to 9 . Thus ten normal 
import functions should have to be estimated, one for each 
sections. However, the trade data of the commodity by 
section is expressed only in value. To find out their 
respective quantity index, the imports value should be 
divided by their unit value index which act as their 
respective price. There is even no unit value index 
provide for the section 9. Although we can obtain it by 
residual as long as the unit value index of all the other 
sections and the total trade are provided, the value of 
its unit value index is found to be negative. But since 
section 9 include the miscellaneous and unclassified 
commodities, such as fire arms, gold., .etc., and its 
volume only occupies a very small proportion of total 
trade, section 9 is omitted in our estimation for normal 
imports• 
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F u r t h e r m o r e , f o r t h e u n i t v a l u e i n d e x of t h e 
commodity by section, section 0 and section 1 have their 
unit value index combined together. The same thing also 
happens between section 2 and section 4. The best way to 
solve the problem is to estimate the combined normal 
import function for section 0 and section 1, and section 
2 and section 4. Thus there will be totally seven number 
of import demand functions of Hongkong to be estimated. 
One must notice that the normal import function 
represents the normal domestic demand for materials and 
consumption. The Hongkong imports data also include the 
commodities imports for re-exports. Thus, the normal 
domestic import demand should be the retained import which 
is the difference between the total imports and total re-
exports .^  
Here the imports demand (i.e. retained imports unless 
stated otherwise) function is constructed as log-linear 
function. 
InM, 二 a + P.inr, + P2』址t + Ps*^ 二 V^i + Pd*^叫-1 + 
+ D2t + + + e^ 
In general the import demand is considered to be 
^However without the re-exports margin, the retained 
二 n ; 二 n t。 
estimate for smuggling. See Sung (1991) for details. 
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dependent on the real GDP of Hongkong and the relative 
p r i c e of t h e c o m m o d i t i e s . L a g g e d v a r i a b l e s a r e a l s o a d d e d 
into the estimation function. If the estimate of the 
explanatory variable's parameter is not significant, it 
will be delete from the function. Then the imports demand 
function of each commodities may be different. 
It is a quite common practice that for the 
consumption demand to be dependent on the real income and 
the relative price of the commodities. But for those 
commodities which are semi-product^ or resource for 
manufacturing, the explanatory variables should not only 
include the relative price of input, but also the demand 
of the final products must be considerate. If the final 
products are mainly consumed by domestic market, there is 
no problems to use the real GDP of Hongkong as a proxy for 
this factor. However, if the final products are mainly for 
export or re-export, this is complicate to include all the 
factors in the international trade. Moreover, external 
deficit exists in reality. Thus it seems that the domestic 
demand (i.e. GDP - net export) will be better to replace 
national income. Thus real domestic demand can be an 
alternative of GDP as the explanatory variable. As the 
data employed is quarterly data so as to get more 
observations, seasonal dummy variables (D2口 D3, and D4,) 
are added into the equation. At the same time we can run 
a time series model for it for forecasting the normal 
import demand if the estimation of the imports demand 
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function is not satisfactory. 
Data Descriptions 
Real GDP ： The GDP in millions calculated on 1980 
price 
Relative price ： The import unit value index divided by 
the GDP deflator 
Import demand ： Import Value - Re-export Value 
U.V.Index(M) U.V.Index(RX) 
In the estimation of the imports demand function of 
Hongkong, it requires the time series data of the above 
variables. However, the data of yearly Hongkong GDP is 
only available after 1966. The number of observations 
seems not enough to support better estimations results. 
Fortunately, quarterly data of GDP is provided. So it can 
be employed in the following estimation. For price index 
and unit value index which are lack of quarterly data, 
average of their monthly data within the quarter then act 
as their respective quarterly data. For those retained 
import volume, their quarterly data are simply the sum up 
of their monthly data. 
The availability of data of unit value indexes 
^source ： ' i g f ^ . 
F 。 卜 • i m q f p q O f Grose; Dpparr.ment, 1966-1991. 
H…q T^ onq Trade I^^diTNumb^. various issues. 
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greater hinder the number of observations employed in the 
estimation of the import demand function. The unit value 
indexes of imports is provided starting from 1976. On the 
other hand, only the unit value indexes of re-exports of 
1979 and onwards are available. Thus, the observations can 
just start from 1979. 
In addition, the observations in the periods that 
smuggling is predicted to be significant should be 
excluded because the normal imports demand do not include 
the imports for further smuggling by definition. With the 
historical description about the smuggling activities 
between Hongkong and China, 1986 and or 1987 is believed 
to be the starting period of serious smuggling. Two sets 
of normal imports demand function can then be estimated 
for forecasting normal imports for the severe smuggling 
periods by using the observations from 1979 to 1986 and 
1979 to 1987 respectively. But with the difference in only 
four observations, there no significant difference between 
them. So the following works will only base on the 
assumption of 1988 as the starting periods of smuggling. 
Estimation Result 
1. Sect-i on 0 and 1 
section 0 composes of the food and live animal 
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chiefly for food. Section 1 composes of beverages and 
tobacco. Their combined import demand function is 
estimated as follow： 
lnMt:。i = 11.828 - 0.43inp^ + O.SlllnY^ 
(21.239) (-3.425) (9 .693) 
+ 0 . 064:lnD2^ + 0 . 10SlnD3^ + 0 .153lnD4f. 
(5.027) (7 . 36) (11.583) 
ADJUSTED = 0 .926 
^t = P^ t-i + ^ t^ 
[it ~ 
Using the estimated function which depends on its 
relative prices and GDP to forecast• the normal import, 
significant difference is found between recorded import 
and normal import. Thus, smuggling is believed to be 
exist. 
Table 4.1 The Forecasting Residuals of Section 0 & 1. 
SECTION 0 &： 1 
RESIDUAL STD ERROR t t 〉 1.697 t > 1.310 
1988 0.089 0.036 2.473 * * 
0.100 0.041 2.434 * * 
0.060 0.042 1.427 " * 
0.044 0.044 1.000 一 一 
1989 0.154 0.046 3.378 * * 
0.069 0.047 1.456 “ * 
0.123 0.045 2.720 * * 
〇•075 〇•046 1 “ . 
1990 0.144 0.050 2.912 * * 
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\ 
0.193 0.051 3.781 * * 
0.086 0.050 1.720 * * 
0.121 0.051 2 .365 * * 
1991 0.130 0.055 2.367 * * 
0.207 0.058 3.564 * * 
0.134 0.056 2.397 * * 
0.105 0 .059 1.774 * * 
Notes： means that there is significant discrepancy from 
zero while ' means that no significant discrepancy 
is found. The symbols of and ' -' carry the same 
meanings in Table 4.2, 4.4, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9. 
With significant discrepancy found, foods are suspect 
to be smuggled into China, although China is a major food 
supplier to Hongkong. Foreign grown fruits are upscale 
goods in Mainland China. They are prohibited from imports. 
Examples of these are Sunkist oranges and Washington 
apples. Thus they are likely to be smuggled into China. 
In Hongkong, alcoholic beverage and tobacco will be 
subject to duties according to their final sale. Heavy 
duties are imposed for domestic sales starting from 1991. 
Large scale of smuggling of cigarettes from China into 
Hongkong is found after 1991. Therefore, before 1991, the 
discrepancy in section 0 and 1 may include smuggling of 
cigarettes into China from Hongkong. In 1991: smuggling of 
cigarettes becomes a minority in section 0 and 1. 
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2. Section 2 and 4 
Section 2 composes of the commodities of crude 
materials, inedible, except fuels and Section 4 composes 
of animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes. As a whole, 
section 2 and 4 represents the organic raw materials. 
Their combined imports demand function is estimated as 
follow： 
二 8.591 - 0 .SS9 lap t + 0.457lnMt—广 
(3.913) (-2.045) (3.295) 
-0.lSlnD3^ 
(-2.795) 
ADJUSTED 二 0 . 3 9 6 
Table 4.2 The Forecasting Residuals of Section 2 & 4. 
SECTION 2 & 4 
RESIDUAL STD ERROR t t > 1 . 697" t > 1.310 
1 9 8 8 - 0 . 0 6 9 0 . 1 7 4 - 0 . 3 9 7 一 一 
-0.353 0.176 -2.005 - 一 
-0.110 0.183 -0.599 - “ 
0.070 0.185 0.380 一 -
1989 0.006 0.193 0.030 一 “ 
-0.054 0.205 -0.266 - “ 
-0.267 0.205 -1.300 - “ 
0.003 0.204 0.015 “‘ 一 
1990 -0.295 0.209 -1.41Q _ 一 
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-0.081 0.212 -0.382 - -
-0.009 0.215 -0.040 - -
-0.047 0.216 -0 .219 - -
1991 -0.334 0.223 -1.498 - -
-0.176 0.234 -0.752 - -
-0.085 0.230 -0.370 - -
- 0 . 3 1 6 0 . 2 4 2 - 1 . 3 0 6 - -
With r2 is only 0.3 96, the prediction power is not 
enough for forecasting the normal imports demand. Thus 
even using the above import demand function to forecast 
the normal imports for 1988 to 1991 and then compares the 
predicted value with the observed value, no residuals are 
found to be falling out of the positive side of the 
confidence interval. In order to have a more precise 
forecasting about the normal imports, a seasonal ARIMA 
model is used： 
r(L。少（L) (l-L)2(l-L"^)iLiV(M广） 
= A (L^)0(L)Gt - 0.007 
( - 0 . 5 4 8 ) 
where, 
a m - 1 + 0 151L + 0.173L2 + 0.149L^ + 0 999L\ 
少 （ ） ‘ ( 2 . 7 9 1 ) ( 2 . 2 2 7 ) ( 2 . 7 7 8 ) ( 1 2 3 . 9 ) 
aiT) = 1 - 0 . 839L - 0 . OSVL^ 
、 ( - 3 . 7 2 4 ) ( - 0 . 3 5 6 ) 
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r(L = 1 + 0 . 183L ^  + 0.988L^^ 
(1.256) (33 .23) 
A (L = 1 + 0 .742L 
(7 .666) 
Table 4.3 The Actual and Forecasting Value of Section 2 & 4 by 
ARIMA model. 
SECTION 2 & 4 
ACTUAL LOWER PREDICT UPPER 
1988 16.043 15.615 15.941 16.268 
15.759 15.454 15.918 16.381 
15.694 14.934 15.484 16 . 035 
16.050 15.006 15.622 16.238 
1989 16.214 14.951 15.738 16.526 
16.273 14.538 15.510 16.482 
15.901 14.235 15.386 16.538 
16.182 14.300 15.621 16.942 
1990 16.037 14.212 15.672 17.132 
16.193 13.847 15.433 17.020 
16.165 13.826 15.538 17.251 
16.300 13.928, 15.774 17.620 
1991 16.096 13.855 15.872 17.890 
16.196 13.386 15.580 17.775 
16.139 12.618 14.981 17.345 
Note: The upper and lower limit is derived from 95% 
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confidence interval. 
The forecasting from the ARIMA model shows that no 
significant discrepancy in Section 2 and 4. No smuggling 
- i s suspected in Section 2 and 4. 
Section 3 
Section 3 includes the mineral fuels, lubricants and 
related material. Its import demand functions is estimated 
as follow： 
InMt了 = 1 1 . 7 2 8 - 0 .996lnY^ + 1 . 4 9 2 1 1 1 1 ^ 2 
(9.813) (-2.928) (3 .629) 
+ 0.018lnD2^ + 0.103lnD3^ 
(2.063) (3.132) 
ADJUSTED R2 = 0.419 
Table 4.4 The Forecasting Residuals of Section 3. 
SECTION 3 
RESIDUAL STD ERROR t t 〉 1.697 t > 1.310 
1988 0.005 0 .086 0.060 " 一 
-0.053 0.092 -0.578 - " 
0 . 044 0.093 0.477 一 " 
-0.078 0 .092 -0.846 _ _ 
1989 0.277 0.091 3.057 * * 
0.067 0.093 0.727 _ ‘ “ 
0.042 0.093 0.455 “ ‘ 
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0.117 0.087 1.344 - * 
1990 0.106 0.097 1.094 - 一 
0.153 0.093 1.642 - * 
-0.239 0.098 -2.424 - -
0.308 0.094 3.272 * * 
1991 0.286 0.093 3.088 * * 
-0.025 0.096 -0.261 - -
-0.035 0.110 -0.320 - -
-0.218 0.104 -2 .099 - -
Again, the R^ is only 0.419. This time, some of the 
residuals from predicted and observed value is 
significantly larger than zero, especially in 1990. But 
with the seasonal ARIMA model estimated, 
r(L。0(L) (l-L)2(l-L〒】(Mt3) 
= A (L^)0(L)et + 0.004 
(0.219) 
ADJUSTED = 0.883 
where, 
0 (L) 二 1 + 0.751L + 0.94L2 
(7.849) (10.24) 
0(L) 二 1 - 1.329L + 1.206L2 _ 0.745L^ 
、 (-7.281) (6.859) (-4.936) 
r(L = 1 + 1 . 886L ^  + 0.996L 幻 
(29 .71) (56.52)‘ 
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A {L^) = 1 + 1.196L + 0 .463L ^^ 
(6 .778) (3.329) 
Table 4.5 The Actual and Forecasting Value of Section 3 by ARIMA 
model. 
SECTION 3 
ACTUAL LOWER PREDICT UPPER 
1988 17.086 16.892 17.087 17.282 
17.014* 17.277 17.473 17.669 
17.347 17 . 058 17.292 17.526 
17.148* 17.219 17.559 17.899 
1989 17.398 16.851 17.307 17.762 
17.228* 17 . 344 17.808 18.272 
17.339 16.742 17.387 18.031 
17.238 16.944 17.725 18.505 
1990 17.130 16.580 17.585 18.590 
17.277 17.141 18.223 19.304 
17.120 16.232 17.614 18.997 
17.551 16.728 18.355 19-982 
1991 17 .446 16.109 18.058 20.006 
17.207 16.603 18.733 2 0.864 
17.412 15.598 18.148 20.698 
Note: When the actual value has a superscript the 
actual value is smaller than [he lower limit of the 
95% confidence interval. 
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It is found that only three period has significant 
derivation from forecasting value and their residuals are 
negative rather than positive. No smuggling is concluded 
in section 3. 
Section 5 
Section 5 is the chemicals and related products. Its 
import demand mainly depends on national income and import 
demand lagged one period： 
InM^^ = 1.236 + Q .幻2lnY仁 + 0 
(0.791) (2.628) (4.012) 
+ 0.llQlnD2^ 
(3.788) 
ADJUSTED R2 = 0.758 
The residuals show that no significant difference 
between observed and predicted value of normal imports 
demand. Thus we can conclude that no smuggling is found in 
Section 5. 
Table 4.6 The Forecasting Residuals of Section 5. 
SECTION 5 
residual STD ERROR t t > 1.697 t > 1.310 
1988 -0.005 0.129 -0.037 "‘ 一 
0.146 0.133 1-100 - -
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0 . 0 5 4 0 . 1 3 5 0 . 4 0 0 - -
- 0 . 0 3 9 0 . 1 3 4 - 0 . 2 9 4 - -
1 9 8 9 - 0 . 0 6 3 0 . 1 3 0 - 0 . 4 7 9 - -
- 0 . 0 8 8 0 . 1 3 3 - 0 . 6 5 9 - -
- 0 . 0 4 7 0 . 1 2 9 - 0 . 3 6 3 - -
- 0 . 1 2 7 0 . 1 2 9 - 0 . 9 8 2 - -
1 9 9 0 一 0 . 0 2 3 0 . 1 2 4 - 0 . 1 8 7 - 一 
- 0 . 0 0 5 0 . 1 3 2 - 0 . 0 3 7 - -
0 . 1 4 3 0 . 1 3 1 1 . 0 9 1 - -
0 . 0 4 8 0 . 1 3 5 0 . 3 5 6 - -
1 9 9 1 - 0 . 0 9 4 0 . 1 3 6 - 0 . 6 9 4 - - 丨 
0 . 0 9 2 0 . 1 3 6 0 . 6 7 4 - -
- 0 . 0 7 2 0 . 1 3 7 - 0 . 5 2 7 - -
- 0 . 0 4 3 0 . 1 3 4 - 0 . 3 1 9 - -
Section 6 
Section 6 is the manufactured goods classified 
chiefly by materials. Its import demand is found to be 
dependent on current GDP and GDP and imports demand lagged 
one period： 
^ 5 734 - 1.87 4iiir, + l;57 9lnF,_, + 0.226liiM,_, 
t ( 9 . 8 1 3 ) ( - 2 . 9 2 8 ) ( 3 . 6 2 9 ) ( 1 . 3 3 5 ) 
+ 〇.492iiD2仁 一 0.208lnD4. 
( 1 . 2 1 5 ) ( - 4 . 5 2 3 ) 
ADJUSTED 二 0 . 8 4 2 
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Most of the residuals show no significant deviation 
of observed value from predicted value. Only several 
periods experience a positive of negative deviation from 
zero. So it is expected goods of section 6 are not the 
majority of smuggled commodities. 
Table 4.7 The Forecasting Residuals of Section 6. 
SECTION 6 
RESIDUAL STD ERROR t t > 1.697 t > 1.310 
1988 0.〇6〇 0 . 094 0.641 — 一 
. 0.137 0.088 1.561 - * 
-〇.063 0.094 -0.668 - -
0 .377 0.089 4 .215 * * 
1989 0 . 104 0 .098 1.062 一 “ 
0 . 036 0.097 0.374 - -
-0.240 0 . 095 -2 . 544 - “ 
-0.211 0.097 -2.170 一 一 
1990 0 . 048 0 . 106 0 .452 一 一 
-0.090 0.099 -0.910 - -
-0.262 0.103 -2.543 一 一 
-0.070 0.103 -0.675 一 一 
1991 -0.036 0.104 -0.346 _ “ 
-0.073 0.114 -0.642 一 一 
-0.281 0.113 -2.473 - _ 
-0.197 0.109 -1.816 - 一 
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Section 7 
Section 7 composes of machinery and transport 
equipments. The import demand function is dependent on 
both its price and GDP： 
InMj = 6 .438 - 0 . SlSlnp^ + 1. OlllnY^ 
(5.177) (-1.766) (9.151) 
+ 0 . llllnD2f. 
(6.152) 
ADJUSTED = 0 .923 
e, 二 pe^ -i + l^t 
From the forecasting residuals plot, there are only 
significant derivations from the forecasting value of the 
retained imports demand in the first half of 1989 and 1991 
if 5% of significant level is used. However, if the 
significant level is relaxed to 10%, most of the time in 
the periods between 1988 and 1991 has their observed value 
significantly different from predicted value of imports 
d e m a n d . M o r e o v e r , a l l of t h e r e s i d u a l s a r e f o u n d to b e 
positive except for the 4th quarter of 1989. Thus it is 
apparent that commodities included in section 7 has 
s m u g g l i n g p r a c t i s i n g . 
M a c h i n e r y a n d t r a n s p o r t s e q u i p m e n t are b u l k y i t e m s 
which requires huge efforts to perform smuggling. Thus 
only with large demand in China will attract smugglers to 
p e r f o r m the s m u g g l i n g of t h e s e t y p e s of g o o d s . H o m e - u s e 
65 
electrical appliance such as colour television sets, video 
recorders and automobile, which are included in section 7, 
are the popular items to be smuggled into China through 
Hongkong due to shortage in legal channel. So the 
smuggling of these commodities explain the discrepancy of 
the observed value and the predicted value. 
Table 4.8 The Forecasting Residuals of Section 7. 
SECTION 7 
RESIDUAL STD ERROR t t > 1.697 t > 1.310 
1988 〇.〇33 0 .097 0.338 一 一 
0.093 0.101 0.916 - -
0.160 0.107 1.497 - * 
0.156 0 .108 1.446 - * 
1989 0.177 0 .102 1.738 * * 
0.189 0.111 1.699 * * 
0.062 0.115 0.535 - -
-0.0 51 0.118 -0 .428 - “ 
1990 0.173 0.117 1.474 - * 
0.171 0.127 1.353 - * 
0.173 0.127 1.358 “ * 
0.160 0.127. 1.265- 一 “ 
1991 0.343 0.131 2.615 • * 
0.361 0.145 2.486 * * 
0.311 0.147 2.113 • 女 
0.255 0.159 1.600 “ * 
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Section 8 
Section 8 is the miscellaneous manufactures articles. 
The normal import demand function is dependent on its 
price, national income and the previous quarter imports 
demand. 
InM^^ = 0 .289 - 0 . 421irzp^ + 1. OlGlnY^ + 0.316lnM仁？ 
(0.331) (-1.92) (4.507) (2.247) 
+ 0.26QlnD2^ + 0.llAlnD3^ + 0.2QllnD4^ 
(5.875) (5 .5449) (6.941) 
ADJUSTED = 0 .9635 
The forecasting residuals are found to be far below 
the positive upper limits. Thus it should conclude that no 
smuggling is suspected to be existed in section 8 from 
1988 to 1991. However, all of the forecasting residuals 
have their value negative and is significantly deviated 
from zero. There are two possibilities to explain for this 
phenomenon. One is that the items in section 8 is smuggled 
from other area into Hongkong to satisfied its consumption 
demand. But this seems not reasonable since except from 
Mainland China, smuggling will incur high costs from other 
area due to the geographic characteristic of Hongkong. 
Moreover, due to its free trade policy except for a few 
items, it is odd to need smuggling as a means to 
satisfactory domestic demand in Hongkong. Thus this 
possibilities should be rejected. ‘ 
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The other explanation is that the goods in section 8 
were the popular items for smuggling into China in the 
period in which the observations is used for estimated for 
normal import demand function. As a result, the normal 
import demand has included the smuggling demand. If from 
1988 to 1991, smuggling of these types of goods has 
stopped, it will lead to the actual imports significantly 
lower than the predicted amount. From 1979 onwards, China 
has began its open door policy such that people living in 
coastal area become wealthier, But their consumption power 
are not high enough to purchase for high tech consumption 
goods as in section 7. Rather, some of the goods included 
in section 8 such as watches, clock and camera are 
believed to be parts of the above items described as 
smuggling items in the early 80's but stopped to be 
smuggled in late 80's. 
Section 8 is the goods which are mainly the popular 
consumption items. In the past, when Hongkong people 
visited their home in Mainland China, they always bring 
back with gifts to their relatives. Most of the gifts are 
the commodities described in section 8. But with the 
improvement of living standard of their relatives, this 
kind of activities declines in late 80's. Thus this give 
another rationalisation for the above prediction results. 
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Table 4.9 The Forecasting Residuals of Section 8. 
SECTION 8 
RESIDUAL STD ERROR t t > 1.697 t > 1.310 
1988 -0.046 0.061 -0 .760 - -
-0.064 0 .066 -0 .961 - 一 
-0.206 0.066 -3.112 - — 
-0.983 0 . 071 -13.930 - -
1989 -0.135 0.074 -1.825 - -
-0.199 0.070 -2.854 - -
-0.461 0.067 -6.857 - -
-0.099 0.093 -1.070 - -
1990 一 0 . 2 2 4 0.085 -2.620 - -
-0.222 0.094 -2.366 - -
-0.507 0 . 084 -6 .056 - -
-0.217 0.109 -1。990 - -
1991 -0.497 0.102 -4.881 - “ 
-0.543 0.133 -4 .082 - -
-1.206 0.130 -9.285 - “ 
.-0.616 0.221 -2 .790 - -
Estimation of the smuQQlina Volume 
Now we have found that commodities in section 0 & 1 
and section 7 are goods most likely to be smuggled into 
China from Hongkong in the late 8 (Vs. The commodities 
classified in section 8 is suspected to be smuggled in 
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early 80's. All these goods are consumer goods. On the 
other hand, commodities classified in section 2 to section 
6 are raw materials. No significant discrepancies are 
found in the above estimations. Since China imposes higher 
tariff on consumer goods than on raw materials, the 
restricted demand on consumer goods seems to induce 
smuggling. This can be supported by the above empirical 
results. 
Then by assuming that the forecasting residuals 
represent the smuggling amount, the smuggling volume in 
each year from 1988 to 1991 are estimated in Table 10. 
Three figures of smuggling volume are provided for each 
years. (5%) and (10%) columns are the smuggling volume in 
each year calculated by summing up the discrepancy from 
forecasting value of each quarter when it is significantly 
different from zero at 5% and 10% significant level 
respectively. ,ALI/ column is the smuggling volume 
computed by summation of those discrepancies regardless of 
the level of significance. 
Table 4.10 The Estimated Volume of Smuggling from 1988 to 
1991. (HK$ million in c.i.f. value for China) 
SECTION 1 
Estimated China's recorded 
Smuggling volume total imports 
Year (5%) (10%) ALL ‘ 
1988 1595 2152 2596 29804 
70. 
1989 2765 4276 4276 34265 
1990 6060 6060 6060 54218 
1991 7343 7343 7343 -
SECTION 7 
Estimated China's recorded 
Smuggling volume total imports 
Year (5%) (10%) ALL 
1988 0 6510 8658 130174 
1989 7892 7892 8165 142007 
1990 0 12967 17237 131383 
1991 30686 39061 39061 -
Note ： 15% is used as re-exports margin to calculate the 
f.〇.b. value of re-exports. Then 5% margin is added to 
convert the f.o.b. value to c.i.f. value. 
Source ： China's recorded total imports from Summary Surveys of 
China's Customs Statistics, various issues. 
From Table 4.10, t'he smuggling volume of Section O&l 
is approximately the same regardless of the method of 
computation. The smuggling volume is found to be around 
10% of the total imports. Moreover, the share of smuggling 
in total imports is rather constant in each year. It is 
quite reasonable as food is a non-durable good. 
However, for Section 1, the smuggling volume varies 
greatly for different method of computation. In 1988 and 
1990, smuggling even disappeared. However, there were 
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rampant smuggling activities during this period. Since 
goods in section 7 are mainly durable consumer goods, the 
demand on them is fluctuate over time. Thus a larger 
significant level is used. Then its largest possible 
smuggling volume is around 8 billion and 17 billion HK 
dollars in 1988 and 1990. In 1991, its volume even reached 
to 3 9 billion HK dollars. But in 1989, a small drop of to 
above 7.8 billion HK dollars is found. Furthermore, the 
ratio of smuggling volume to legal trade volume varies 
significantly. This may result from different year 
measures against smuggling activities being employed in 
different year. 
From the above results, smuggling only occupies a 
small share in total imports. However, goods are likely to 
be smuggled to satisfy demand from the relatively more 
open and wealthier coastal areas in Mainland China. Then 
in these areas, the share of smuggling in imported goods 
may be larger. The impact of smuggling on these areas 
cannot be neglected/ 
Since smuggling is also a kind of re-exports of 
Hongkong which is not reported in the official statistics, 
Hongkong can gain from smuggling by the value added 
4in the next chapter, estimates for smuggled television s”s 
o c c u D V a b o u t 75% of share in total imports. Thus the relatively 
？ o w e f s S r f o f smuggling in section 7 may be due to including of 
imported products without smuggling. 
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process. 15% re-exports margin is used in the 
calculation.^ By multiplying the re-exports margin to the 
estimated smuggling volume, the contribution to Hongkong 
of smuggling can be found.^ 
Table 4.11 The Estimation of the Contribution to Hongkong of 
Smuggling. (HK$ million) 
• SECTION 1 
Year (5%) (10%) ALL 
1988 199 269 324 
1989 346 534 534 
1990 758 758 758 
1991 918 918 918 
SECTION 7 
Year (5%) (10%) ALL 
1988 0 814 1082 
1989 987 987 1021 
1990 〇 1621 2155 
1991 3836 4883 4883 
^Annual survey of re-exports of Hongkong in 1991. by Hong 
Konq Census and Statistics Department provides the estimates ot 
re-exports margin. It is found to.be about 13 4% and the re-
export margin for China goods is even higher. However no 
estimate of it is provided. So 15% of re-exports margin m China 
trade is assumed. ‘ 
6N〇tice that the estimated smuggling volume a， China imports 
in Table 10 has already been converted into c.i.f. value. 
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From the estimation result, goods classified in 
section 7 have much greater contribution to Hongkong than 
in section O&l. Their contribution is about 800 million to 
4.8 billion of Hongkong dollars while the contiributioris 
from goods in sections O&l is only around 200 to 900 
million. Smuggling of goods in section 7 seems to play an 
much essential in Hongkong economy. 
Moreover, since Hongkong GDP is calculated by 
‘ : - . 
expenditure approach, with understated net exports, GDP 
will obviously be understated also. Official computation 
of the Hongkong GDP and its growth rate will be affected. 
After taking smuggling into account as re-exports (with 
re-exports margin included), GDP and its growth rate 
should be adjusted. 
Table 4.12 The adjusted Hongkong GDP by expenditure 




,5%, ‘10%' 'ALL' 
1988 247415 248287 252151 253568 
1989 254434 259640 260378 260511 
1990 262189 264928 270790 272720 
1991 272480 288167 291622 291622 
Source： Official data from Pnarterlv Est-iinafps of Gross 
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Domestic Product 1966-1991. 
The adjusted growth rate in 1988 and 1991 is 
different significantly from official data (See Table 
3.12). In 1988, the 'actual' growth rate (assuming that 
smuggling starts at 1988) is understated by about 0 .38% to 
2 . 69%. In 1991, the 'actual' growth rate is understated by 
about 3% to 4 . 84%.., In 1989 and 1990, the 'actual' growth 
rate may be understated or overstated, according to 
different choice of estimates of smuggling volume. 
Therefore, we find that smuggling plays a rather important 
role in Hongkong economy. 
Table 4.13 The adjusted growth rate of Hongkong GDP. (%) 
Official Adjusted 
data data 
,5%, ‘10%' 'ALL' 
1988 8 .29 8.67 10.36 10.98 
1989 2.84 4.57 3.26 2.74 
1990 3 . 05 2 . 04 4.00 4.69 
1991 3 . 93 8.77 7.69 6.93 
Source： Same as Table 4.12. 
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Chapter 5 
Misinvoicing in China trade with Hongkong 
Misinvoicing may be motivated by two types of 
incentives. The first type is to use misinvoicing as an 
alternative of smuggling. Unlike smuggling, misinvoicing 
still go through legal channels but with under-reported 
volume or value so that less duties are charged. Hence, 
whether it is exports or imports, there will always be 
underinvoicing in foreign trade when dealing with 
smuggling purpose. 
The second type is to hide its actual trade volume in 
order to avoid turning over the foreign exchange earned to 
the central government. In China, provincial governments 
and trade enterprises have to give up a portion of the 
foreign exchange earned through exports to the state by 
selling them to the Bank of China in exchange for renminbi 
according to the official exchange rate. The retention 
rate will be the remaining portion which can be held for 
further purchases of foreign goods that are subject to the 
approval of the state. If the retention rate is low, the 
enterprise will have more incentive to misinvoice its 
trade. Thus underinvoicing exports can hide its actual 
earning of foreign exchange whereas overinvoicing imports 
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can overemphasis its using up of foreign exchange earned. 
Then retaining more foreign exchange is the other goal of 
misinvoicing besides smuggling. 
It is interesting to see how the firm decides on 
misinvoicing and to what extent the misinvoicing will be. 
Let retaining foreign exchange be the objection function 
of the firms to be maximized, tt. Then, 
(5.1) n 二 iX-M) - (1-r) [ 
X and M is exports and imports in foreign currencies. r is 
the retention rate. Bx and are the extent of 
misinvoicing of exports and of imports. 9 with positive 
value represents overinvoicing whereas negative value 
represents underinvoicing. To maximize the objection 
function, the solution is unbounded as will tend to be 
zero and Qm will tend to be infinity. However, this is 
impossible as it must be detected by the Customs. So the 
countering effect will be the risk costs in misinvoicing. 
(5 2) n = iX-M) - (1-r) [(1+0^) 
-XC{Q^) - MC、Qm、 
C(e) are the risk costs functions for each portion of 
dollars of foreign exchanges involved in faked invoice and 
is applicable to both misinvoicing of exports and imports. 
C(8) has the properties that, 
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(5.3a) C(e) = C(-6) 
is.3b) C^O) > 0 if e > 0 
(5.3c) c/(0) < 0 if e < 0 
(5.3d) c"-e) = -did) 
T h i s m e a n s t h a t the r i s k c o s t s of t h e s a m e e x t e n t of 
o v e r i n v o i c i n g a n d u n d e r i n v o i c i n g w i l l b e the s a m e , i.e. , 
C (e) is s y m m e t r i c a b o u t the o r i g i n . T h e n the first o r d e r 
c o n d i t i o n f o r m a x i m i z i n g r e t a i n e d f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e w i l l 
b e , 
(5.4a) -(1-r) = 
(5.42?) (1-r) = C^O^) 
=> < 0, > 0 
... - ^ ( 0 ； , ) 
二 〉 ： 0M 
T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t the e x t e n t of m i s i n v o i c i n g of e x p o r t s 
a n d i m p o r t s w i l l b e e q u a l in t h e o p t i m a l s o l u t i o n . T h u s , 
f o r a f i r m e n g a g e d in f o r e i g n t r a d e , it w i l l a t t e m p t to 
u n d e r i n v o i c e its e x p o r t s and o v e r i n v o i c e its imports b y 
t h e same, p e r c e n t a g e . 
However, for imported goods, one more consideration 
is a d d e d . If i m p o r t e d g o o d s are s u b j e c t to t a r i f f , t, for 
e a c h u n i t of o v e r r e p o r t e d spent f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e , it can 
b e n e f i t b y t h e p o r t i o n of r, (since r u n i t of foreign 
e x c h a n g e c a n b e r e t a i n e d ) , b u t at t h e s a m e t i m e , it has to 
p a y f o r a n a d d i t i o n a l t u n i t s of d u t i e s a p a r t from the 
r i s k c o s t s of f a k e d i n v o i c e . T h e o b j e c t i v e 'function then 
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changes t o , 
(5.5) n = iX-M) - (1-r) [ 
-XC{Q^) - - tM 
F.O.C., 
(6.6a) -(1-r) = ( ： / ⑷ 义 ） 
{6.6b) . (1-r) 二 + t 
=> -c^ej + t 
=> -co^) + t 
Now the extent of underinvoicing of exports and 
overinvoicing of imports will no longer be the same. The 
tariff will obviously reduce the extent of misinvoicing of 
imports comparing with exports. To the extreme that tariff 
rate is larger than the turn over rate ,i.e., 1-r, imports 
may be underinvoiced to bypass the high tariff rate. It is 
because if t is larger than 1-r, C, (ej must be negative, 
which implies that is negative also. Smuggling replaced 
misinvoicing for retained foreign exchange in the case of 
imports. Then the target for retaining more foreign 
exchange will be achieved by underinvoicing of exports. 
However, the above consideration neglects the origin 
of misinvoicing in China foreign trade. In China, due to 
the strict control on foreign exchange, the black market 
exchange rate is much higher than the official one. The 
original goal of misinvoicing is to avoid the strict 
control of foreign exchange which not only limit the 
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holding of foreign exchange but also the use of it. The 
resulting disparity between the official and the black 
market exchange rates will alter the decision of 
misinvoicing if duties are paid by domestic currency. 
Hence, the objactive function and F.O.C. are changed to: 
(5.7) n = {{X-M) - (1-r) [ 
+ (l-r) [ (1+e^) X-{1+Q^)M] e。 
(5.8a) -d-r) ^ ^ ^ = 
(5.8i^) (1-r) eB-e。二 c^o ) + t 
eo 
Thus we find that if the gap between the black market and 
official exchange rate widens, the effect of reduction in 
the overinvoicing of imports will be diluted. 
By comparing the value of the tariff, rate, t, with 
the effective rate of retaining foreign exchange, {1-r) {e^-
e。) /sq, the direction of misinvoicing of imports can be 
found. First of all, if the former is smaller than the 
latter, there will be overinvoice of imports： 
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(l-r) - t = 付）> 0 
白o 
=> 0M > 0 
It is because for each dollars overinvoiced by the extent, 
9m/ (l-r) unit of foreign exchange, which is worth (1-
r) (eg-eo) in domestic currency, can be additional retained. 
At the same time, the additional duties needed to paid is 
worth eot, 1 then the overinvoice extend will reach its 
limits when the marginal risk costs, C (6) , is equal to 
their gap. 
However, if the effective rate of retaining foreign 
exchange is just equal to the tariff rate, there will be 
no benefits in misinvoicing, so no misinvoicing of imports 
will be the results： 
(l-r) ^ ^ - t 二 = 0 
e。 
=> 0M = 0 
Notice that even if C,(〇）is not necessarily equal to 
zero, corner solutions will be the result when C (0) is 
larger than zero, such that there is no misinvoicing in 
imports. 
lit is because the amount of duties needed to be paid is 
calculated by Customs using official exchange rate. 
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If the tariff rate is larger than the effective rate 
of retaining foreign exchange, then underinvoicing can 
escape the tariff with the trade-off of losing foreign 
exchange holding. 
(1-r) - t = C^id^) < 0 
e。 
=> 0M < 0 
Comments on the comparison between China and Hongkong 
trade statistics 
In the works of Fung (1987) , the China's official 
exports data is compared with Hongkong's official imports 
data. By assuming that Hongkong data represents the actual 
trade volume, his major concern is to test whether faked 
invoice exists rather than to find the misinvoicing 
volume. Since the exports data of China is in f.o.b. value 
while the import data of Hongkong is in c.i.f. value, the 
assumption of 10% margin is adopted.^ About 60 commodities 
in each years are compared from 1982 to 1986. M^i/Xci is 
the ratio calculated by dividing the recorded exports in 
China by the recorded imports in Hongkong of commodity i. 
Thus there are 60 Mhk to X^ ratio in a year. Their mean and 
2it seems to be too large when it is applied in China trade 
with Hongkong. 
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standard deviation of each year is calculated. A t —test is 
performed for each year to see whether there is 
significant discrepancy of the sample mean from 1.1. 
However, there are certain problems in his approach. 
First of all, each division (2 digits) in each year is 
considered as a sample observation. The M^k to X^ ratio of 
the 60 divisions then act as the sample to estimate for 
the population mean of M^k to X^ ratio and to test for the 
existence of underinvoicing of exports (i.e. the sample 
means is significantly larger than 1.1.). Thus, each 
division is the elementary unit of the population. If the 
testing result is significant from 1.1, this only implies 
that the Mh^ to X^ ratio of the divisions as a whole is 
larger than the trade value. In fact, the best way to 
reflect the general tendency of misinvoicing is to use 
transactions in trade as the elementary unit of the 
population to see the frequency of faked invoice in 
transactions. If the number of transactions of a division 
in a year is available, then the number of transactions of 
a division can be used as a weight to find out the 
weighted average of the ratio M^ to Xc as the sample mean. 
One alternative is to use the share in total trade of the 
divisions as the weight. By this way, the weighted average 
will in fact be the Mhk to X。 ratio of the total trade of 
a year. Since, 
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二 y^ M � X^. 
E^ci L Xci J^Xci 
- E 夢 K = 
Xci E Xci 
i二1,2, ,n 
But it comes to the problem of the standard error 
since the number of observations, n, is undefined. If each 
dollar of transactions is treated as one observation, the 
standard error will likely to be very small, such that the 
result of the t test will surely be significant from 1.1. 
In other words, the weighted average approaches the 
population mean. The significant test for the mean seems 
to be meaningless. 
Moreover, according to Fung, even if the null 
hypothesis of population means of M to X equal to 1.1 is 
not rejected, there may still be some traded divisions 
that practise misinvoicing. Thus it lacks the ability to 
identify the type and volume of commodities in which faked 
invoice are involved. Again, the number of transactions of 
a division traded can provide a more precise conclusion 
about the misinvoicing of a division of goods. On the 
other hand, if Fung's method employs time series data of 
a division instead of cross-sectional data in a year, the 
judgement about misinvoicing of a division by his method 
can be valid only when the institutional setting and the 
trade environment remain constant over time. 
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Finally, M^ k to X^ ratio is bounded by zero. When 
reported exports value of a division is so large that M H K / X C 
is approaching zero, it can be easily outweighed by a Mhk 
to Xc ratio of a division that is larger than 2. As a 
result, taking the average of M^^/X^ is not a appropriate 
method. It is better to use logarithm value of M^JX^ for 
the testing as it is symmetric in value when overinvoicing 
and underinvoicing are done by the same portion^. (eg. 
ln(l/2) = -ln(2)) 
In comparing the trade statistics of China and 
Hongkong, problems arises in estimation for misinvoicing. 
In misinvoicing of China exports to Hongkong, the major 
problem is the different statistical classification of 
traded commodities in by the two places. Even though both 
of the them follow SITG system, all exports from 
processing/assembling operations in section 9 in Chinese 
statistics from 1985 to 1991 while Hongkong classifies 
those products into their respective sections according to 
their types. Thus, even if there is no misinvoicing in 
China's exports, the recorded exports volume of each 
sections/divisions in Chinese statistics will be smaller 
than in Hongkong statistics, except for section 9. Thus 
trade statistics between Hongkong and China can only be 
compared by the total exports from China to Hongkong. 
^Recallinq the objective function of misinvoicing, the same 
p^oble^nThapperfs t 。 二 f ^ ^ c ： ^ 
cfl^fl.e) ) . r u H T l T e n ^ di^ferenc'e above c^onclusion 
drawn. 
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Table 5.1 The amount of under invoicing in exports from 
China to Hongkong. (HK$ million) 
Amount of China recorded 
Mhk/Xc Underinvoicing Exports to HK 
1988 1.092 5984 142495 
1989 1.151 17265 170944 
1990 1.136 17877 207871 
1991 1.171 30331 250670 
Source： China's data from China Customs Statistics 
Hongkong's data from Hong- Kong- Trade Statistics 
Assume that the margin for converting f.o.b. value to 
c.i.f. value is 5%. Then the trend of misinvoicing is 
increasing for recent years. In 1988, the misinvoicing 
volume is about 6 billions HK dollars. In 1989 and 1990, 
the misinvoicing volume is approximately the same, i.e. 17 
billion HK dollars. In 1991, its volume reaches a high 
peak of about 3 0 billions HK dollars. Therefore, similar 
to smuggling, this illegal trade practice is rampant in 
recent years. 
On the other hand, the discrepancy between trade 
statistics of the two places is much larger in China's 
imports. Since Chinese Customs often fails to ascertain 
the country of origin for the re-exports from Hongkong, 
part of these re-exports are regarded as imports from 
86 
Hongkong. Thus estimation for misinvoicing in China 
imports is very difficult, if not possible. But since 
misinvoicing is of little concern in this study, it is 
left out here. However, if misinvoicing (both exports and 
imports) can be estimated by better methods, the black 
market exchange rate may also be predicted.^ It may be 
useful in other field of study. 
4see Appendix A for details. 
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List of symbols 
X ： The amount of China exports 
M ： The amount of China imports 
Xhki : The Hongkong official recorded amount of China 
exports to Hongkong in division i 
Mci ： The Chinese official recorded amount of China 
exports to Hongkong in division i 
9x ： The extent of misinvoicing in China exports 
0M ： The extent of misinvoicing in China imports 
GQ ： The official exchange rate 
Sg ： The black market exchange rate 
r ： The retention rate of foerign exchange 
t ： The tariff rate 





Once the smuggling volume is estimated, we can turn 
to the welfare analysis. Recall the discussion in Chapter 
2, smuggling can lead to gain and loss of the economy. ^  
The gain is mainly due to the deviation of the domestic 
price of the good from the tariff-included price so that 
there will be consumption gain to the economy. The loss is 
mainly the smuggling costs incurred to the economy. From 
Bhagwati‘s study, for the economy to have welfare 
improvement from smuggling, it will only occur when legal 
trade is completely eliminated by smuggling. It is because 
when domestic price deviates from the tariff- included 
price, legal trade will lose in the competition with 
smuggling. As long as legal trade exists, the domestic 
price will still be the tariff-included price, so there 
will be no consumption gain to the economy but only with 
smuggling costs incurred. Thus, the elimination of legal 
trade is the necessary condition for welfare improvement. 
It is not the sufficient condition because the net effect 
of smuggling will still be determined by the amount of 
consumption gain and the smuggling costs. 
ipor the normative judgement about the trade barrier, it is 
always doubt that it is beneficial. 
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In most of the smuggling cases, complete elimination 
of legal trade rarely occurs. It is quite reasonable 
because elimination of legal trade will provide a signal 
to the government that smuggling activities are rampant. 
If the government has the strong determination to fight 
against smuggling, its reaction will lead to the rise of 
smuggling costs to a level that legal trade appears. Then 
for the economy, there will always be real loss from 
smuggling. 
In this situation, it is clear that there is no 
consumption gain. Accounting for the costs of smuggling 
which is assumed to be the total loss of the economy, it 
will easily be calculated by multiplying the smuggling 
value and the tariff rate of the commodity if smuggling 
industry is under perfect competition. It is because under 
perfect competition, the smugglers will earn zero profit. 
As a result, the total average costs for smugglers must be 
equal to the domestic price, i.e. tariff-included price. 
Thus, 
AC + Pf = (1 + tz) Pf 
二 〉 AC = . P -t 
(6.1) ... C = S * AC = S 本 Pft 
二 * t 
where t ： tariff rate 
V ： value of the smuggling volume ‘ 
S ： smuggling volume in quantity 
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If the smuggling industry is monopolized, it is quite 
difficult to predict the costs of smuggling as AC will not 
be equal to P^tS. It will require us to estimate for the 
marginal costs of smuggling in order to know the total 
smuggling costs. But at least we know that the smuggling 
costs will be bounded by the smuggling costs under perfect 
competition as calculated above. 
We find that the welfare loss of the economy by 
smuggling will exactly be the loss of government revenue 
from tariff by smuggling when it is under perfect 
competition. The tariff revenue (which is a transfer 
within the economy) is replaced by the resources used in 
smuggling. However, we know that even if the total real 
loss (social costs) is represented by the smuggling cost 
C, there is further welfare loss for the society. Since 
the resource costs is unproductive for the economy, the 
real income of the economy will decrease. The direct 
effect of this lump sum reduction qf real income will lead 
to the decline of imports demand which shrinks the foreign 
trade volume if balance trade is assumed (See Fig. 6.1). 
As a result, domestic exports will be reduced. Then the 
real income of the economy will further be reduced. Thus, 
if the real income is used to represent the welfare of the 
economy, the loss of real income will not only include the 
resource costs of smuggling but also the induced reduction 
of exports which will decrease the gain in trade. Fig. 6.1 
shows the resulting welfare situation. 
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aWI ： Total welfare loss in terms of exportable goods. 
C ： Smuggling costs. 
S ： Smuggling volume. 
L ： Legal imports volume. 
STC ： Smuggling Transformation Curve. 
pf ： Free trade world price. 
So far we have only considered the case that the 
government reaction will finally lead to welfare 
reduction. In fact, if the smugglers can expect the 
response of the government, apart from carrying out their 
smuggling activities, they will also import some goods 
legally to the extent that the signalling from reduction 
in imports (or to the extreme that legal imports is 
completely eliminated) disappeared. In this sense, legal 
imports can reduce the detecting power of the government. 
Or in other words, legal trade can provide camouflage for 
smuggling which can reduce the smuggling costs from 
government reaction. Then the domestic price may still 
have a chance to deviate from the tariff-included price. 
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If the amount of legal goods required for covering the 
smuggling activities is not too large, the loss from legal 
trade by the smugglers (the difference between the revenue 
from legal trade and the legal import costs, i.e. (P® -
pf(l+t))L can be compensated by the gain in smuggling. It 
is possible for the domestic price to be lower than the 
tariff-included world price with the existence of legal 
trade. Once the domestic price can deviate from the 
tariff-included price, smuggling may not necessarily come 
to the welfare loss situation. We should notice that in 
this situation, all the legal traders must be engaged in 
smuggling if deviation of domestic price from tariff-
included price is the final result. If some of the legal 
traders has no connection with smugglers and they can 
still exist in the market, the domestic price must still 
be equal to the tariff-included price which indicates that 
the economy must be suffering a loss from smuggling. 
The above idea is* best expressed in Pitt (1984). He 
modified Bhagwati's framework on smuggling by adding the 
camouflage effect of legal trade in smuggling.' The 
following is the summary of his work： 
旦二 g(l,s) ： the quantity of smuggled goods that 
successfully exit the domestic economy 
^However, his camouflage effect is somewhat different from 
the above This covering effect on smuggling by legal goods is 
S L S o n i n g within the same period, rather than based on the 
consideration on government reaction in the future. 
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s ： the quantity of smuggled goods prepared for exiting 
the countries. It can be viewed as the input for 
smuggling. The difference between s and s will then be the 
smuggling costs. 
1 ： the quantity of legally traded goods. 
qs ： the domestic price of the exportable goods. 
qf ： the international price of the exportable goods. 
The function g has the following properties： 
(6 . 2a) >0 
(6 . 2b) 1 > g^ > 0 
(6.2c) s > s 
Assumption (4.2a) ensures that 1 can reduce the costs 
of smuggling. Assumption (4.2b) ensures that the marginal 
costs of smuggling is positive and assumption (4。2c) 
ensures that smuggling costs can never be negative。 
To maximize profit, 
n =q^g{lrS) + qHl-t) 1 - g^{l + s), 
with F.O.C. 
g  j + qHi-t) = gs 
Q^STs = 
Under perfect competition, zero profit is earned, 
( 6 . 3 ) g s 二 + 
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Thus we find that the domestic price of the 
exportable goods will be the weighted average of the free 
trade price and the tariff-included price. 
In the following paragraph, Pitt's framework will be 
the basis for the welfare analysis with the following 
modification. Firstly, his framework is for the case study 
of smuggling activity in Indonesia where the major 
smuggling item is the exports of rubber. But turning to 
the case in China, smuggling occurs mainly in imports, 
thus the term 1-t will become 1+t • Secondly, he assumed 
that the smuggling costs will be represented by the goods 
sunk into the sea. This means that the costs is accounted 
in terms of the smuggling commodities. However, the 
smuggling costs will be very dependent on the price of the 
smuggling goods. When the price doubles, the smuggling 
costs will double as well. This will be acceptable if the 
loss of seized goods is the only costs of. smuggling. But 
the real loss is the resources used in smuggling which may 
not vary directly with the prices of the smuggled 
commodities. Thus, instead of using initial smuggled 
volume, s, as an input of finally successfully smuggled 
volume,旦，a cost function is used to replace it in the 
profit function of the smuggler. 
From Pitt's works, there will be no unique welfare-
rank for smuggling when domestic price can be lowered 
through smuggling. Smuggling must lead to welfare loss 
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when domestic price remains the same as tariff-included 
price. In fact, the conclusion is no different from 
Bhagwati suggestion except that legal trade may coexist 
with smuggling when domestic price deviates from tariff-
included price. The welfare comparison is summarized in 
the Fig. 6.2a and Fig. 6.2b. 
ps : Domestic prices with smuggling. 
E ： E q u i l i b r i u m p o s i t i o n w i t h s m u g g l i n g . 
S — 
ET ： E q u i l i b r i u m p o s i t i o n w i t h n o n - s m u g g l i n g . 
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In order to simplify our analysis, we assume that the 
smuggled imported commodities in China are products that 
are not produced domestically. This can be rationalized by 
the fact that the quality of these import commodities are 
quite different from that of domestic outputs. Some 
examples are automobiles and household electrical 
appliances. Their demand in China is mainly due to their 
foreign origin, which is a symbol of superior quality. 
Through this assumption, the domestic supply sides will be 
no longer needed to be considered in our welfare analysis. 
In addition, the domestic supply may not respond to the 
domestic price as in a market economy since the economy of 
China has not yet thoroughly transformed to a market 
economy. Some industries that have foreign competition, 
such as the automobile industry, are still state-owned 
enterprises. Thus we assume that no import-competing 
production of that good. We can then remove the PPF from 
the two goods diagram. 
F u r t h e r m o r e , Pitt employed .the two goods framework in 
his analysis. The two goods are the importable and the 
exportable goods. But in our empirical study, it is quite 
difficult to use the, aggregate data for exports and 
imports as the two goods since smuggling exists in limited 
types of commodities. The contrast of smuggling and legal 
trade volume will be blunt. Thus we let a particular 
imported commodity as one of the goods and the national 
income as the other goods in the .wo goods model. Then we 
. 97 
must assume that the welfare analysis compares only the 
welfare between smuggling and n〇n—smuggling of that 
particular commodity, i.e. the smuggling condition (with 
or without smuggling) of other commodities is kept 
constant. 
Here we found that the X-axis represents the quantity 
of a particular • commodity, X, in which smuggling is 
involved. Notice that from the previous assumption, the 
imported commodity has no corresponding domestic output, 
thus X can simply represent the import demand quantity of 
this commodity and consumption on domestic product can be 
neglected. 
The Y-axis in fact represents the expenditure on 
other goods. The Y-coordinate of every point on the budget 
line represents the real income minus the consumption 
expenditure on X under general equilibrium. Then the 
vertical intercept of the hypothetical budget line will be 
the national income, Y, which can represent the welfare in 
welfare comparison. 
By comparing the real income of the economy under 
smuggling and non-smuggling of this co觀odity X, we can 
conclude that this particular smuggling activity is 
beneficial to the economy or not. 
With the present existence of smuggling, the national 
9 8 
income is represented by the data of national income 
provided, i.e. Y®. But the national income of non-
smuggling, yt, in this period is not known as this 
situation does not occur. Some more work is needed so that 
welfare comparison is feasible. 
In order to perform the welfare analysis, i.e. to see 
whether smuggling will lead to net gain or net loss to the 
economy, the effects of welfare improvement and welfare 
reduction by smuggling should be isolated. By finding 
their corresponding magnitude separately, the net gain or 
loss can be verified. We first assume that the domestic 
price has not deviated (i.e. with smuggling costs remains 
here) and changed from p^ back to pf(l+t) • The equilibrium 
position will move from point E^ to point E^. Then the 
F 
welfare change will be -aW^. This is the welfare gain from 
smuggling because reversing the process, aW^ is the welfare 
gain from domestic price deviation.(Fig. 6.3) 
t pvA r\ 
1 \ 1 — I \ M 
L__ 1 ^ 
… Chy⑴ 
secondly, then the smuggling activity is completely 
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eliminated such that the equilibrium position moves from 
Eq to Et which is the equilibrium of non-smuggling. This 
can be done by adding back the smuggling costs to the 
national income at E。，. The welfare change will be aW^ 
which is the welfare loss of smuggling which is induced by 
the smuggling costs. (Fig. 6.4) 
munvji) p 、 •f,,、 
L 1 > M 
Let us consider the gain from smuggling. From Fig. 
6.3, the welfare gain, aW^, is due to the consumption gain 
from the deviation of domestic price from tariff-included 
price. The consumption gain is then represented by the 
increasing exports for the payment of the imports which 
lead to a rise in national income. ‘ To measure the 
magnitude of aW^, we must firstly construct a imports 
demand function for the commodity. 
(6.4) M 二 F、Y,pd、 
3ln the general equilibrium framework, balance trade is 
always assumed. 
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The domestic relative price of the commodity, pd, is 
computed by dividing the nominal price of the commodity by 
the general price level of the economy. 
With the import demand function, we can solve for 
which is the import demand at E。, by the equation： 
(6 .5) AfO = APV^ S^ 'P f (1 + t)) 
Since when using income as an welfare index for welfare 
comparsion, income at different utility levels should face 
equal price for feasible comparsion, therefore, Y® will be 
the national income at price p^ (1+t) . aW^ is the amount of 
reduction/increase in import value times the tariff rate, 
i . e . , 
(6 .6a) L^g : (Afs-Afo)p f (1 + t) — p ^  
= p ^t 
M® is the imports demand under smuggling. Therefore, 
{6.6b) = + ) 
Once we can solve for by equation 6.6b, aW^ can also be 
solved. As a result, can be calculated. 
Obviously, this method has a little drawback because 
with this calculation, the welfare gain is overestimated 
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since the budget line, is not tangent to the social 
indifference curve, Us. The actual welfare gain should be 
the difference between Y®' (income at which budget line is 
tangent to U3 facing the tariff-included world price) and 
1 \ \l Y- Ird^ rcQfi 
M I k 
However, the position of Eg, is difficult to identify 
because both of the Y®' and M®' are unknown. Therefore using 
ys for welfare analysis will overstate the welfare gain. 
How can Y® be determined? Y® can be obtained by adding the 
product of total import (both legal and illegal) and price 
disparity (p^  (1+t) - p^) to compensate for the reported 
national income so that the original consumption bundle 
can be determined. 
Now, we can turn to the loss from smuggling. The loss 
from smuggling is mainly due to the real cost from 
smuggling when national income in real terms is used as a 
measure of welfare. But from Fig. 6.4, we find that the 
loss should be the distance A+C which is larger than C, 
the smuggling costs. It is because when real costs is 
involved, the reduction in income will lead to the decline 
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of the import demand at constant prices. Decreasing import 
will in turn decrease export which will cause further 
decrease of national income. 
From Fig. 6.4, A in fact is the amount of tariff 
revenue reduced due to the induced decline of import 
demand by the smuggling costs. 
Thus, for welfare loss, 
(6.7) aW^ = A+C 
where A 二 subsequent loss of consumption gain in trade 
=(IVT - M°)p"t 
C = smuggling costs 
(6.8) MT = FiY^+AW^P^il + t)) 
where = 
mt is the imports demand under non-smuggling. From the 
computation of welfare gain, the value of M。 and Y。 are 
calculated. Then if the smuggling costs, C, can be known, 
we can solve for the equation 6.8 and get M^ With M^ and 
C known, welfare loss can be obtained. To obtain C, recall 
the equation 6.3 that the domestic price is the weighted 
average of the free trade price and the t a r i f f - i n c l u d e d 
price, once we know their values together v^ith the trade 
volume of both legal and smuggling, the smuggling costs 
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can be obtained. 
...-‘-
Finally, the net impact of smuggling on welfare can 
be known. 
> 
kW = AW^ - AW^ = 0 
< 
Thus, the key point for this method of welfare 
analysis is the import demand function. There are two 
major problems to deal with. One is the estimation of 
these import demand functions. The other will be the 
functional form of the import demand functions. 
For the first problem, the data involved in the 
estimation of the import demand function should include 
both the data from the period with and without smuggling. 
Moreover, with the assumption of a small economy, there is 
no need to consider the supply side as the free trade 
price and tariff rate are given. But because national 
income is one of the explanatory variables, the data 
should at most only be yearly data. Then with limited 
y e a r l y o b s e r v a t i o n , t h e n u m b e r of e x p l a n a t o r y v a r i a b l e s is 
also limited for achieving a satisfactory result. 
The other problem will be the functional form of the 
import demand function. Since and M^ are' needed to be 
solved by the function, if the functional form is too 
1 0 4 
complicated, there will be great difficulty in solving 
them. However, these problems can be avoided. Recalling 
Fig. 6.3, it can be presented in another way. (Fig. 6.6) 
Y 卜 
〜 广 k y 广 滅 d I'aQ. 
For the welfare gain in smuggling, the initial impact 
is the price disparity which stimulates foreign trade. 
From Fig. 6.6, G represents this initial impact. (Notice 
that here the domestic price is change from P® to pf(l+t)' 
G should in fact represents the initial loss if price 
disparity disappears.) 
(6.9) G 二 P FT:[MS - MS") 
Let's draw a hypothetical line which is parallel to 
world price and passes through point E^ " • We find that G is 
the vertical distance between this hypothetical line and 
the free trade line. When this initial impact, G, is 
deducted from the income Y^ to arrive at E。, it follows 
exactly the same way as the initial impact of smuggling 
costs, C, deducting from Y^ to arrive at E。，’except with a 
different magnitude. If C is larger (smaller) than G, Y^ 
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must be larger (smaller) than Y^ under certain income 
elasticity requirement.\ Therefore, without getting Y。, 
conclusion about the direction of welfare change by 
smuggling can be drawn by simply comparing C and G. Thus 
the analysis method can be simplified. 
So far we have considered the impact of smuggling has 
effect on the trade volume, i.e. the exports/imports 
stimulated in general equilibrium. One may question that 
for a particular type of good, the increasing demand may 
not necessarily stimulate exports. Rather, the trade 
balance is worsened and vice versa. This leads to the 
partial equilibrium analysis. Then the harm from smuggling 
will only be due to the smuggling costs. The benefit will 
be from the gain in consumer surplus. To compute the net 
gain, consumer surplus derived from the import demand 
function is compared with the costs. In the following 
paragraph, the welfare analysis will also employ this 
method as a supplement to the former. 
々See Appendix B for details. 
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List of symbols^ 
pf ： world price 
pd ： domestic price . 
pS ： domestic price under smuggling 
t ： tariff rate 
S ： smuggling volume 
L ： legal import volume 
C ： costs of smuggling 
G ： see pp.105 
STC ： smuggling transformation curve 
Us ： social utility level under smuggling 
UT ： social utility level without smuggling 
aW^ ： welfare gain from smuggling 
aVJI ： welfare loss from smuggling 
Eg ： equilibrium position under smuggling 
ET ： equilibrium position without smuggling 
EQ ： equilibrium position with smuggling costs incurred 
only 
Es, : equilibrium position (see Fig. 6.5) 
Eg.. ： equilibrium position (see Fig. 6.3 and Fig. 6.5) 
ys ： income at Eg --
yt ： income at E^ 
Y。 ： income at E。 
ys' ： income at Eg, 
Bpiease notice that the symbols employed by Pitt (pp.93 -
p p . 9 5 ) areSesonmOe^wLt different to the symbols listed below. 
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MS ： total import at Eg 
mt ： total import at E^ 
： total import at EQ 




The Empirical Study 
Welfare Analysis on smucrgling of Television Sets ： a 
typical case of smuggling between Hongkong and China 
In the smuggling activities between Hongkong and 
China, the most popular items are tobacco, automobile, 
television set and video recorder. These goods are items 
most frequently seized by the Customs. Moreover, the 
empirical works in Chapter 4 has shown that the 
commodities classified in section O&l and section 7, in 
which the above items are included, have smuggling 
existed. Thus they are considered to be the major 
commodities of smuggling. With a lower living standard in 
China, these goods are luxuries there. But with rapid 
economic development, especially in the coastal areas, the 
demand for them are huge. However, domestic outputs cannot 
satisfy the growing demand. One major factor is the lower 
’ quality of domestic products when compared with foreign 
ones. As a result, people prefer foreign products. But 
with the government policy of protecting the domestic 
industry and reducing trade deficit, trade barriers are 
imposed on these goods. In 1985, with already high tariff, 
a d d i t i o n a l I m p o r t s A d j u s t m e n t D u t i e s are i m p o s e d s u c h t h a t 
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the effective tariff rate for television sets and 
automobiles reach 170% and 230% respectively (see Table 
7.1). With this trade barriers, most of the consumers 
cannot afford the items. 
Table 7.1 Tariff rate of China in 1985 to 1991 
Tariff rate Imports Adjustment 
Duties rate 
Television sets 100% 70% 
Automobile 150% 80% 
Tobacco 180% -
Source： Almanac of China's Foreign Relations__ajid_Trade, 
various issues. 
To complete the welfare analysis on smuggling between 
Hongkong and China, it will be wise to estimate the 
w e l f a r e i m p a c t s of t h e s e p o p u l a r s m u g g l e d g o o d s . H o w e v e r , 
difficulties arise when dealing with tobacco/ automobiles 
and video recorders. One major problem is the lack of 
domestic prices data. Without domestic price, not only 
that the price disparity cannot be known, but also the 
smuggling costs will become a mystery. The only way is to 
estimate the maximum possible loss by smuggling by 
e m p l o y i n g B h a g w a t i ' s f r a m e w o r k of c a l c u l a t i n g t h e 
^Before 1991, cigarette is believed to be smuggled from 二。二. 二，‘』 
government. The direction of smuggling seems to reverse. 
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smuggling costs using equation 6.1. 
Furthermore, smuggled automobiles are found to be 
stolen cars from Hongkong. The theoretical framework 
discussed before therefore cannot be used. Since stolen 
cars require no purchasing, then if smuggling costs is 
significantly low, the domestic price of smuggled cars may 
even fall below the world price. The economy of China then 
benefits from smuggling. Due to the comparative high risk 
faced by the smugglers and the consumers, it is reasonable 
to believe that the market of the legal products and the 
illegal products will be separated. The illegal goods will 
most likely be monopolized. The welfare condition becomes 
rather complicated. Nevertheless, whether it is beneficial 
to China's economy, it is worse off for Hongkong. 
On the other hand, video recorders become consumer 
item in China only in recent years. Thus the lack of time 
series data makes the construction of import demand 
function' for it difficult. However, since television set 
is a complement of video recorder and have similar 
smuggling costs and tariff, their respective welfare 
impacts are believed to be identical. 
Fortunately, the above problems are absent in the 
welfare analysis on smuggling of television sets. Its 
demand in China has lasted since the beginning of 80's. 
Relatively long time series data are available (1980 
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onwards) . Moreover, and most important, its domestic price 
is available. Thus welfare comparison can be performed. 
There are three major steps in the following welfare 
analysis . Firstly, employing the same method as in Chapter 
4' the smuggling volume of television sets is predicted. 
Then the import demand on televisions sets in China is 
estimated. Finally, the smuggling costs, C, and the 
initial gain, G, will be computed and compared by the two 
methods discussed before. 
Prediction of Smuggliner Volume of Television Sets 
In the late 80, the demand on colour television sets 
is relatively higher than that of monochrome ones. Also, 
most of the seized goods of television sets are the colour 
type. It is believed that they form the majority of 
smuggled television sets. Moreover, since households in 
Hongkong now rarely purchase monochrome television sets, 
it is hard to estimate the retained import demand of 
Hongkong for these. Thus the following estimation will 
focus only on colour television sets for the prediction of 
smuggling volume of television sets. (We assume that no 
monochrome television sets are smuggled into China from 
Hongkong in the late 80,s.) 
Since the quantity of the commodity is directly 
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available this time, the problem of price data can be 
solved by dividing the trade value by trade quantity. Thus 
we can estimate the normal retained import demand starting 
from 1976 (since quarterly data of Hongkong GDP is 
available starting from 1976). Again, it is assumed that 
there is no smuggling of colour television sets before 
1988.2 The following is the estimation results and the 
forecasting residuals. 
InM^ = -31. 189 + 3 . 5461 InY^ + 1. S465lnP^ 
(4.145) (6.079) (3 .466) 
+ 0.29747D2t +0.17 571D4^ 
(2.651) (1 . 562) 
ADJUSTED = 0 .6936 
From the estimated function, the price elasticity is 
found to be positive. It can be explained by the improving 
quality of colour television. Thus price function as a 
signal of quality. With higher quality/technology, the 
demand will obvious be higher following the higher price. 
The R" is only about 0.7, the predictive power of this 
imports demand function is not high enough. We find that 
with 5% significant level, less than half of the periods 
2Tn fact the assumption of 1987 and 1986 as the starting 
sLaciling has been tried. Due to unsatisfactory 
year 二 yt?r，arr【【i ?•二），they have been abandoned Moreover, 
ti?e pricf ri?orms allows greater flexibility of domestic 




Table 7.2 The Forecasting Residuals of Retained Imports Demand 
on Colour Television Sets of Hongkong. 
RESIDUAL STD ERROR t t > 1.684 t > 1.3 03 
1 9 8 8 0 . 5 3 3 9 5 0 . 3 2 5 7 4 1 . 6 3 9 1 9 0 - * 
0 . 1 3 6 0 . 3 3 8 3 1 0 . 4 0 1 9 9 8 - -
0 . 7 6 4 3 4 0 . 3 4 2 4 4 2 . 2 3 2 0 4 0 * * 
0 . 3 6 8 4 2 0 . 3 4 9 8 9 1 . 0 5 2 9 5 9 - -
1 9 8 9 0 . 4 4 8 5 0 . 3 3 2 8 5 1 . 3 4 7 4 5 3 - * 
0 . 4 5 9 4 1 0 . 3 3 7 4 2 1 . 3 6 1 5 3 7 - * 
0 . 1 6 5 1 8 0 . 3 3 8 0 3 0 . 4 8 8 6 5 4 - -
- 0 . 0 8 3 7 1 0 . 3 3 8 3 1 - 0 . 2 4 7 4 5 - -
1 9 9 0 0 . 3 7 6 8 2 0 . 3 3 1 0 7 1 . 1 3 8 1 8 8 - -
0 . 4 4 3 4 6 0 . 3 3 9 0 4 1 . 3 0 7 9 8 7 - * 
0 . 6 0 1 1 6 0 . 3 4 4 5 9 1 . 7 4 4 5 6 6 * * 
0 . 6 8 8 3 3 0 . 3 4 3 3 5 2 . 0 0 4 7 4 7 * * 
1 9 9 1 1 . 0 7 7 5 0 . 3 3 0 7 5 3 . 2 5 7 7 4 7 * * 
1 . 0 3 9 2 0 . 3 4 6 0 1 3 . 0 0 3 3 8 1 * * 
0 . 9 3 2 8 7 0 . 3 4 3 1 1 2 . 7 1 8 8 6 5 * * 
0 . 4 9 0 6 4 0 . 3 5 1 4 9 1 . 3 9 5 8 8 6 一 • 
Note: 丨  *” means that the residual passes the significant 
level while ” -" means that the residual is 
insignificant from zero. 
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However, we find that the predicted pattern is quite 
similar to the prediction results of Section 7, especially 
the forecasting residuals are both found to be negative in 
4th quarter of 1989. Moreover, the trend of deviation from 
forecasting residuals is very strong after 1990. 
Nevertheless, three sets of predicted smuggling volume are 
computed, i.e., with 5%, 10% and 100% significant level of 
rejecting zero residuals. (For simplicity, we call these 
as "5%", "10%" and "ALL" estimation results of smuggling 
volume.) 
Table 7.3 The Estimated Smuggling Volume (no.) of Television 
Sets from Hongkong to China. 
(5%) (10%) ALL 
1988 257047 350060 516012 
1989 0 206715 224885 
1990 479374 590262 646306 
1991 951589 1168151 1168151 
We find that the smuggling volume increased from 1988 
to 1991 except for a drop in 198 9. In 1988, the smuggling 
volume for television sets ranged from 257 thousand to 516 
thousand. In 1989, the maximum possible number of 
smuggling television sets was only about 225 thousand 
which is smaller than the "5%" estimation of smuggling 
volume in 1988. Thus, it seems that the smuggling was not 
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rampant in this year. One reason may be due to the 
political crisis in China in 1989 which led to the 
strengthening of security along the border. Then in 1990, 
the smuggling volume rose again to between 479 thousand 
and 646 thousand. A sharp rise of smuggling in 1991 
brought the number to 952 thousand or even 1.16 8 million. 
With the consistency and significance of the figures, we 
can believe that the smuggling problem in 1991 was the 
most serious one within the four years. 
The Estimation of Import Demand on Colour Television Sets 
of China 
From the official data provided, the import demand 
for colour television sets in China has fluctuated 
markedly. The first peak years of importing television 
sets were 1980 and 1981, with the import volume of 2.45 
and 3 .98 million. The first drive of economic reforms 
occurred at that time and income of the coastal areas rose 
rapidly. Then the imports volume dropped to 1.04 million 
in 1983. The second peak year was 1985 with an import 
volume of up to 5.09 million. Then the volume quantity 
dropped to around one million per year from 1986 to 1989. 
This was the period after China strengthens her trade 
barriers by sharply raising the effective tariff rate. 
However, the recorded import further dropped to 670 and 
330 thousand in 1990 and 1991. In comparison, the 
smuggling volume accounted for about one third of the 
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total import volume in 1988. But in 1990 and 1991, its 
weight in total import rose to about one half and over 70% 
respectively. Thus the official data also support the 
above estimates on the smuggling of the television sets. 
Table 7.4 The Recorded Imports of Television Sets in China. 
QUANTITY VALUE 
1980 2450 196020 
1981 3980 314240 
1982 1040 109770 
1983 540 49920 
1984 1470 254920 
1985 5090 993900 
1986 1390 305490 
1987 1070 185870 
1988 1290 237030 
1989 1300 230110 
1990 670 103460 
1991 330 56200 
Unit：1000 Unit:US$1000 
Source： nhina^ s Foreign Economic Statistics 1979-1991. 
The predicted smuggling volume is then added to legal 
trade volume to get the total import demand. Since we have 
three sets of estimated smuggling volume, three sets of 
total import demand are available, then three separate 
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import demand functions will be estimated. 
It IS appairent that the import demand function of 
television sets depends on income and price. With the 
strategy of “allowing somebody to be wealthier first", the 
income distribution in China has become very uneven during 
the economic reforming period. The television set is 
therefore treated as either luxury or normal good 
depending on the development pace of different area. It is 
obvious that the major demand for foreign television sets, 
which are not affordable for the poorer area in China, is 
from the coastal areas. As so far Guangdong has played a 
leading role in the economic reform in China, the national 
income of Guangdong can best be used as a proxy to 
represent the income of the wealthier class in China. 
Furthermore, because of proximity, smuggling goods from 
Hongkong enter mainly into Guangdong. Thus the national 
income of Guangdong is used in the estimation of the 
import demand on television sets under the assumption that 
most of the imports will be consumed in Guangdong.‘ 
• As a result, the domestic price data (both the 
general price index and the price of television sets) in 
Guangdong will be employed in the estimation of import 
demand function. The official data on the domestic price 
« 
3tt . OMP nf China in the estimation for imports demand 
U s i ， 〇 f j f i n a of the estimates for 
function has been t n e d . wi&n found to be negative and 
二iti^mererpdecfitriy由srcC^i一^ • is employed for more 
satisfactory results. 118. 
in Guangdong is provided starting from 1984. The domestic 
price data before 1984 are missing. However, this problem 
can be overcome as the price was still under strict 
control by the state before 1988. With the international 
price and tariff rate provided, the domestic price can 
then be computed to solve the problem. 
On the other hand, the data of domestic price is for 
domestic outputs only. Fortunately, in 1984, the domestic 
prices of various foreign brands of foreign made 
television sets are available. This can serve as a 
reference for adjusting the price of domestic output to 
represent the prices of foreign output. As Japanese made 
television sets are the popular consumer choice, their 
prices are used for the adjustment. In 1984, the price was 
around $1400 (reminbi) per set。 At the same time, dividing 
the total import value by the import volume of television 
sets in China gets the international price (without any 
mark up) . When it is multiplied by the tariff rate, the 
result is about $864. This shows that there is a mark up 
of about 60% if the tariff is effective. Using 60% as the 
mark up, the domestic price of foreign output before 1988, 
the free trade'world price, and the tariff-included world 
price after 1987 are computed. 
With the liberalization of prices control in 1988, 
the domestic price of Chinese made television sets after 
1987 is directly employed with little modification. The 
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ratio between the domestic price of foreign output and 
domestic output in 1984 is used to adjust the domestic 
price of domestic output to represent the domestic price 
of foreign output after 1987. 
With the assumption of constant elasticity, Cobb 
Douglas function is used to represent the import demand 
function of television sets. 
M = 灯 apP 
Again, log-linear function is used as the function 
for estimation. However, with only two dependent 
variables, national income and relative price, the 
estimation result is not satisfactory. Although the 
elasticity of income and price are positive and negative 
respectively, they are not significant. Furthermore, the 
r2 is too small (around 0.02) . This happening is due to 
rapid shifts in the demand pattern in China as a result of 
rapid economic development as well as frequent policy 
changes. Thus, it requires some dummy variables to be 
added into the demand function to give significant result. 
The demand functions with dummy variables are then 
estimated as follow：^ 
^Date Source： Ouanadoncr Statistical_Yearbook, various 
issues. . 
Gunaadona Price Yearbook, various issues. 
China Foreign Economic Statistics 1979-91. 
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{ALL) 
InMt = 6.9357 + 2.4012lnY^ - 0 .91209lnP^ 
‘ (14.15) (3.127) (-3.984) 
—0 .9036D1^ -2 . 1451D2^ — 1 . 89 
(-3.429) (-5.959) (-6.153) 
+ 0.90589D4^ + 1.80SD5^ + 2.3S52D6^ 
(7.012) (4.806) (5.853) 
ADJUSTEDR^ = 0.9721 
- (10%) 
InMt = 7.0101 + 2.3011nY^ - 0.9926lnP^ 
(21.39) (4.48) (-6.082) 
—0 . 8656D1^ -2 . 0SS9D2^ - 1. S361D3^1nY^ 
(-4.913) (-8.678) (-8.93) 
+ 0.9121D4t + 1.8279^5^ + 2 .44361^5 ^  
(10.56) (7.268) (8 .967) 
ADJUSTEDR^ 二 0 . 9 8 7 5 
(5%) 
InMt = 7 .1724 + 1.84791127, - 0.82037iiiP, 
(12.84) (2.111) (-2.95) 
- 0 . 9 5 1 8 9 M , -2.119D2, - 1. SSI 9D3 ,lnY ^ 
(-3.17) . (-5.311) (-5.301) 
+ 0 . 85249D4t + 1.85871)5^ + 2 .41871)5^ 
(5.787) (4.336) (5.208) 
ADJUSTEDR^ 二 0 . 9 6 4 8 
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Table 7.5 The Dummy Variables used in the Estimation of Imports 
Demand on Television Set of China 
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 
1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1981 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1982 1 0 0 1 0 0 
1983 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1984 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1985 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1986 0 1 〇 0 0 1 
1987 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1988 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1989 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1990 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1991 0 0 1 0 1 0 
The dummies are set according to the changes in 
economic environment in Guangdong.^ Dl, D2 and D3 
represent the three stages of development in the 8 0,s to 
early 90, s. Zero value is assigned to Dl, D2 and D3 of 
1980 and 1981 which are the periods of the first reforms 
drive. Value of one is assigned to Dl of 1982 to 1985 
which are the period of second reforms drive. D2 is one in 
1986 to 1989 which is the latter stage of economics 
5The following interpretation of the dummy variables is only 
suggestive. Other interpretations are possible. 
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reforms in the 80's. From the estimation results, we find 
that the estimates of parameters of D1 and D2 are both 
negative. Moreover, the magnitude of D2 is larger than D1. 
This means that the constant term of the Cobb-Douglas 
function is decreasing overtime. This implies that the 
demand is shrinking overtime. However, the income 
elasticity is still very elastic. One explanation is that 
the income disparity in China become more serious in the 
late 80's than in, the beginning. Thus only a relatively 
fewer wealthier households can afford to replace their old 
television sets with new ones. This phenomena can be 
further supported by the dummy D3 which alters the income 
elasticity in 1990 and 1991. In this period, the income 
elasticity becomes less than 1. Thus, television sets 
become a necessity for the wealthier class. 
D4, D5 and D6 represent the changes in demand for 
quality of television sets. From 1980 to 1983, demand was 
mainly for monochrome ones. After 1984, people can afford 
colour television sets. Thus the import demand for 
television sets is firstly divided into two segments, from 
1980 to 1983 and from 1984 to 1991. But there are sharp 
rises in the demand within both of these periods. From 
1980 to 1983, the sharp rise happened in 1981 and 1982; 
while from 1984 to 1991, the sharp rise occurred in 1985 
and 1986. These sharp rises can be explained by the fact 
that when income increases, people have a strong desire to 
improve their living standard. As television set is 
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leisure good, the demand for it will experience a sharp 
rise when people become more affluent. However, since 
television set is durable consumer good, the demand for it 
will become stable again after a short time. Thus, D4, D5 
and D6 will have the value of one when the year is 1981 to 
1982, 1984 to 1991 (except 1985 and 1986) and 1985 to 1986 
respectively• 
Due to the very erratic shifts in demand patterns in 
China, the use of ad hoc dummy variables is unavoidable. 
The estimated demand function and the estimates of welfare 
impacts of smuggling should be regarded as suggestive 
rather than definitive. As the economic system in China 
settles down and becomes more stable in the future, better 
estimates of China's imports demand and better estimates 
of the welfare impacts of smuggling can hopefully be made 
with the present methodology. 
Comparison between Gain and Costs 
Method 1： The general equilibrium framework 
Costs is computed first/ By equation 6.2, smuggling 
costs can be found by the price disparity from smuggling. 
AS smuggling between Hongkong and China chiefly occur in 
imports, equation 6.2 is changed to: 
一 m a k e s no difference in the computation of smuggling 
costs in mtthod 1 and method 2 as it does not depend on the 
imports demand function. 
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The costs of smuggling and average costs have been 
calculated as follows： 
Table 7.6 The Estimation of Total Costs and Average Costs of 
Smuggling. 
($1000) ($ per set) 
C AC 
ALL 1988 730534 1416 
1989 403467 1793 
1990 943834 1461 
1991 1125326 963 
C AC 
(10%) 1988 442689 1265 
1989 371189 1793 
1990 846006 1434 
1991 1125326 963 
C z AC 
(5%) 1988 281427 1095 
1989 - -
1990 652097 1361 
1991 845447 888 
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The computation result shows that the average costs 
for the smuggling of television sets is around $1500 per 
set from 1988 to 1990. But there is a significant drop to 
below one thousand dollars in 1991. In 1989, the domestic 
price is even a little bit higher than the tariff-included 
world price. Then the average costs of smuggling must be 
equal to the domestic price (tariff-included world price) 
and the total costs of smuggling will then be the amount 
equal to P^tS if smuggling really exists in 1989. 
To compute the gain from smuggling, G, which is equal 
to pft (ms - ms") , M^ " must first be found by the imports 
demand functions. 
M^ " is the import demand when price changes from P^ to 
pf (1+t) . The term M®" (P^  (1+t) -P^) is used to compensate the 
income so as to maintain the same income level.? Moreover, 
since M^ " is calculated from the estimated import demand 
function, there exists a problem that whether the 
residuals got from the estimation of China's import demand 
function, which will directly affect the constant term of 
the Cobb-Douglas function, should be included in the 
“ 7工n a Cobb Douglas function and with a small volume 
imports comparing to the national income, the impact of adding 
this term to the national income is extremely small. 
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computation. ® Thus two sets of M^ " are calculated, with and 
without the residuals. 
Table 7.7a The Estimation of Gain from Smuggling, with the 
consideration of residuals. ($1000) 
Ms" G 
ALL 1988 1730.538 140448 
1989 1525 0 
1990 1206.340 221772 
1991 1059.771 1083267 
Ms" G 
(10%) 1988 1570.058 130174 
1989 1507 0 
1990 1152.888 216620 
1991 1052.061 1102328 
Ms" G 
(5%) 1988 1492.266 101869 
1989 1300 0 
1990 1067.654 164510 
1991 957.2917 802655 
8工f residuals are included, it implies t h ^ t ^ g 二 is ^^ ^ 
relationship between the residual and smuggling activity in this 
peroid, and vice versa. 
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Table 7. 7b The Estimation of Gain from Smuggling, without 
the consideration of residuals. ($1000) 
Ms ” G 
ALL 1988 1524.714 523525 
1989 1525 0 
1990 1182.130 270733 
1991 1078.676 1036537 
Ms" G 
(10%) 1988 1473.900 309142 
1989 1507 0 
1990 1160.494 201238 
1991 1045.799 1117807 
Ms" G 
(5%) 1988 1383.696 303939 
1989 1300 〇 
1990 1097.930 103281 
1991 933.8766 860535 
Again, since there is "no price disparity by 
smuggling, the gain in 1988 面 s t be zero. Thus comparing 
the gain and costs, there must be loss incurred by 
smuggling if it really exists in 1989. Using the method 
with the consideration of residuals in estimating the 
gain, there are always significant net loss in 1988 and 
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1990. The costs are at least two times larger than the 
gain. Only in 1991, the costs and gains are found to have 
less than 4% difference. 
Table 7. 8a The Comparison between Costs and Gain, with the 
consideration of residuals. ($1000) 
C G NET GAIN 
ALL 1988 730534 140448 -590086 
1989 403467 0 -403467 
1990 943834 221772 -722062 
1991 1125326 1083267 -42059 
C G NET GAIN 
(10%) 1988 442689 130174 -312515 
1989 371189 〇-371189 
1990 846006 216620 -629386 
1991 1125326 1102328 -22998 
C G NET GAIN 
( 5 % ) 1 9 8 8 2 8 1 4 2 7 1 0 1 8 6 9 一 1 7 9 5 5 8 
1989 -
1 9 9 0 6 5 2 0 9 7 1 6 4 5 1 0 - 4 8 7 5 8 7 
1991 845447 802655 -42792 
The picture has changed if the residuals are not 
included in the computation of gain. In 1988, the 
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difference between gain and loss is only about 30% if 
"10%" or “ALL“ estimated smuggling volume are used. There 
is even net gain if "5%" estimation is used. In 1990, the 
net loss situation is more stable that the costs is around 
4 to 6 times the gain. In 1991, the welfare implication is 
somewhat similar as before. With "5%" estimation method, 
there is even net gain in 1991 • but with still 
insignificant difference between costs and gain. 
Table 7.8b The Comparison between Costs and Gain, without 
the consideration of residuals. ($1000) 
C G NET GAIN 
ALL 1988 730534 523525 -207009 
1989 403467 0 -403467 
1990 943834 270733 -673101 
1991 1125326 1036537 -88789 
C G NET GAIN 
(10%) 1988 442689 309142 一 1 3 3 5 4 7 
1989 371189 0 -371189 
1990 84 6 0 06 201238 -644768 
1991 1125326 1117807 -7519 
C G NET GAIN 
(5%) 1988 281427 303939 22512 
1989 -
130. 
1990 652097 103281 -548816 
1991 845447 860535 15088 
Method 2： The partial equilibrium framework 
Now, the effect of stimulating trade from smuggling 
is neglected. The only change in the method is the 
computation of the gain. To Find out the gain, the import 
demand function will change to a function of domestic 
price which represents the marginal utility： 
. ( 7 . 1 ) 二 
w i t h the deviation of domestic price from tariff-
included price to the smuggling price, the import demand 
will change from M^ to M^ Then by integrating the marginal 
utility from M^ to M" and then subtracting it by the 
purchasing costs of additional imports, the increase of 
consumer surplus can be found. (See Fig. 7.1) 
力 G 二 f dM -
口 • 引 Jms KY^ 
-A 1 1 丄 
一 （ 們 P (M广 1 一 M厂下） - p H M ' - M ^ 
= 可 
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The gain calculated here is smaller than in method 1. 
It is obvious that The estimation results of net loss is 
quite similar to the previous one. However, in 1991, the 
net gain computed without the consideration of residual is 
replaced by net loss. 
Table 7.9a The Comparison between Costs and Gain, without 
the consideration of residuals. ($1000) 
C G NET GAIN 
ALL 1988 730534 135606 -594928 
1989 403467 0 -4 03467 
1990 943834 206254 -737580 
1991 1125326 795572 -329754 
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C G NET GAIN 
(10%) 1988 442689 125683 -317006 
1989 371189 〇-371189 
. 1990 846006 201457 -644549 
1991 1125326 809254 -316072 
C G NET GAIN 
(5%) 1988 281427 98358 -183069 
1989 - - -
1990 652097 153021. -499076 
1991 845447 591176 -254271 
Table 7. 9b The Comparison between Costs and Gain, without 
the consideration of residuals. ($1000) 
C G NET GAIN 
； L^ 1988 730534 453283 -277251 
1989 403467 〇-403467 
1990 943834 247458 -696376 
1991 1125326 774464 -350862 
C z Q NET GAIN 
(10%) 1988 442689 283221 -159468 
1989 371189 0 -371189 
1990 846006 188180 -657826 
1991 1125326 815918 -309408 
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C G NET GAIN 
(5%) 1988 281427 271993 -9434 
1989 -
1990 652097 98784 -553313 
1991 845447 616059 -229388 
Testinq for the Sicmificance of the Predicted Loss 
One may notice that the welfare implication is 
greatly affected by the estimation of the price elasticity 
of the import demand. If the actual demand is elastic in 
respect to price change, the gain in consumption surplus 
due to the reduction of price will be relatively larger. 
Net welfare gain by smuggling may be possible. The larger 
the actual price elasticity, the larger the net welfare 
gain will be and vice versa. 
With the smuggling costs given, we can find out the 
price elasticity such that the gain from smuggling will be 
equal to the costs, i.e., the net welfare gain is zero. 
Thus if the estimate of the price elasticity is 
significantly different from this price elasticity, with 
which the net welfare change by smuggling is zero, there 
will be strong evidence to support the welfare implication 
from our prediction. 
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To get the price elasticity of the turning point of 
welfare implication, the amount of increase of import 
demand 'resulting from price disparity according to this 
price elasticity must be found first. Let Mg" ‘ be the 
import demand when domestic price changes back from P® to 
pf(l+t) while other things are kept constant. Since at this 
time, the smuggling costs, C, must equal to the gain, G, 
C 二 G = pfti^s -拟 
=> (7.4) M S…: M S — — ^ . 
P'^t 
Once we get the value of M^" ‘ , its corresponding value 
of the price elasticity can be found. 
M^ = KYSapS》��� 
MS'" = KY^UPUl + t))^"' 
Dividing M^ '" by M^, we get: 
= ( pHl^t) ) p/// 
MS -
込川 _ 
In order to test for the significance of the welfare 
implication drawn (i.e., there are net loss by smuggling 
in 1988, 1990 and 1 9 9 1 ) , the following hypotheses apply. 
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HQ ： S < S" ‘ (The actual elasticity is large enough that 
there will be net welfare gain by 
‘ smuggling.) 
HA ： > 13)" ' (The actual elasticity is small enough that 
there will be net welfare loss by 
smuggling.) 
From Table 7.10, the null hypothesis is rejected in 
1988 and 1990 while it cannot be rejected in 1991. 
Table 7.10 Result of the hypothesis testing for the 
significance of the welfare implication. 
Ms"‘ S", t 
ALL 1988 1413.489 -5.58032 18 . 88620 
1990 849.3030 -4.89285 16 .06872 
1991 1042.757 -1.01753 0 . 186242 
(10%) 1988 1402.146 -3.56817 10 . 55563 
1990 841.6760 -4 .50780 14 .40658 
1991 1042.757 -1.01753 0.102185 
(5%y 1988 1395.791 -2.34222 6.237123 
1990 826.5580 -3.67997 11.71971 
1991 939.9804 -0.87162 0 .210078 
I 
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Concluding remark 
From the above welfare analysis, we can conclude that 
the smuggling of television sets is not • beneficial to 
China‘s economy. There seems to be strong evidence to 
suggest that smuggling leads to welfare loss in 1988 and 
1990. In 1989, if smuggling really exists, it also create 
net loss to the economy. But in 1991, no conclusion can be 
drawn about the welfare implication of smuggling. 
Smuggling generally worsens the welfare in the period 1988 
to 1991. ‘ 
From Table 7.11, we find that the effective tariff 
rate decreases over time. One may suggest the smuggling of 
television sets begins to be beneficial to China's 
economy. But if the response of government is taken into 
account, this may not be true. 
Table 7.11 The prices comparison and effective tariff rate 
of imported television sets. 
Effective 
Ps Pf(1+t) Tariff rate 
1988 2829 2956 158% 
1989 2891 2848 174% 
1990 2937 3212 147% 
1991 2750 3926 89% 
Source ： r^iianadona pti hp. Year Book, various issues. 
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In this welfare analysis, several limitations are 
present. Firstly, we assume that Hongkong is the only 
channel' for smuggling into China. In fact, Taiwan and 
Macau also play the role of smuggling bridgeheads but with 
believably smaller smuggling volume than Hongkong.^ 
Nevertheless, the smuggling volume of television sets must 
be underestimated. However, it does not change our 
conclusion that net loss is the result of smuggling. It is 
because if the actual smuggling volume is larger than our 
predicted value, it "should" have a larger impact on price 
disparity. Thus the actual contribution from smuggling on 
price disparity is even smaller. The predicted net loss 
will be understated. 
Secondly, we have assumed that before 1988, there was 
no smuggling of television sets into China. But if 
significant scale of smuggling existed, the imports volume 
before 1988 is understated which will affect the 
estimation of the imports demand function. 
Thirdly, we assume that China (or Guangdong) is a 
small economy so that its demand for imports will have no 
influence on the terms of trade. If world price is raised 
due to growing demand in China through smuggling, the 
welfare will further worsen. 
between the Mainland ^^d Taiwan 
makes smuggling difficult. T r a n s p o r t a t i o n facilities in Macau 
c o m p a r a t i v e l y inferior to Hongkong s. 
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Fourthly, the problem of quantitative restriction on 
imports have been neglected in our study. Quantitative 
restriction on foreign trade is another tool of trade 
V 
barrier. According to Falvey (1978), smuggling will lead 
to welfare improvement. This conclusion is valid only when 
tariff is absent. The domestic price distortion from 
quantitative restriction provides premium to the trade 
enterprises possessing imports quota. As a result of 
smuggling, decline of domestic price will not decrease 
legal trade. The rent of legal importers will be reduced 
instead. Therefore, the economy must be better off by the 
price disparity. 
In China, the story is somewhat different. 
Quantitative restriction and tariff are employed together 
to restrict the imports demand. The former limit the 
quantity of goods imported legally while the latter sets 
a price floor for the foreign goods if quantitative 
restriction is not effective. Then, there are two market 
situations if no smuggling exists. In the first situation, 
the quantitative restriction may be so tight that the 
domestic price is even higher than the tariff-included 
world price (See Fig.. 7.1a). .The rent of foreign trade 
will be shared by the government and the enterprises. In 
addition, the effective tariff rate is higher than the ad 
valorem tariff rate. 
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On the other hand, if the quantitative restriction is 
very liberal, .the minimum possible domestic price is the 
tariff-included world price. The actual imports volume 
will be smaller than the official restricted amount (see 
Fig. 7.2b). Tariff functions as a backup support for trade 
barriers. Now the rent is completely captured by 
government. 
Consider the above situation when smuggling appears. 
In the first case, smuggling may make the final domestic 
price either higher than or lower than the tariff-included 
world price. If the final domestic price is higher than 
the tariff-included price, smuggling is necessarily 
welfare improving. Legal trade volume is not altered. The 
only effect is the reduction of rent of the legal 
importers. However, if the final domestic price falls 
below the tariff-included price, some or all of the legal 
trade will be eliminated. The welfare implication of 
smuggling is ambiguous. (See Fig. 7,3a and 7.3b) 
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In the second case, smuggling necessarily cause 
decline of legal imports. The-same welfare implication is 
the same as without quantitative restriction (since 
quantitative restriction is not effective at the 
beginning). 
In China, many imported goods are still under 
quantity restriction. They are mainly the consumers goods. 
Household electrical appliances, transportation equipment, 
acholic beverages and tobacco are included in this 
category. To import these goods, imports licenses are 
required so that the government is able to control the 
imports quantity. Therefore, we find that the quantity 
restriction on imports.will affect our empirical analysis 
of the television sets smuggling by two ways. One is the 
domestic price data while the other is the conclusion of 
the welfare analysis. 
‘ It will pose no problem to our study if domestic 
1 4 1 
price data of foreign goods is provided. However, 
recalling that except for the data in 1984, the domestic 
price of television sets from 1980 to 1987 is represented 
by the tariff-included world price. Since it is possible 
for the domestic price to be higher than the tarif f-
included price, the above data cannot reflect the actual 
domestic price. The accuracy of the domestic price data 
(1980 to 1983, 1985 to 1987) will affect the estimation of 
the import demand function and the smuggling costs. 
However, in the calculation of the domestic price 
from 1980 to 1987, the domestic price of television sets 
in 1984 is used as a reference for adjustment. 60% mark up 
is found in 1984. This mark up represents partly the 
effective tariff rate caused by quantitative restriction. 
So this problem is partly overcome. 
For the welfare analysis, previous welfare 
implication about smuggling will be reversed, if the 
quantitative restriction is effective in 1988 to 1991. In 
198 9, as domestic price is approximately the same as 
tariff-included world price, obviously no legal trade is 
substituted by smuggling. It is most likely that smuggling 
is welfare improving in 1989. In 1988, 1990 and 1991, the 
domestic price is below the tariff_included world price. 
The welfare implication is ambiguous. 
However, with the decentralization of trade regime, 
1 4 2 
it is doubtful that quantitative restriction functions as 
effectively a trade barrier than as tariff. Moreover, the 
practice of using administrative means to replace the 
market is mostly replaced by interventions through the 
market. The assumption of ineffective quantitative 
restriction for 1988 to 1991 is required for the validity 
of our welfare analysis. 
Lastly, the estimation of import demand in China 
creates difficulty of the welfare analysis very much. With 
erratic demand pattern over time in China, a lot of dummy 
variables are required. The dummy variables are a little 
bit arbitrary. The previous rationale for the dummy is 
only a possible suggestion. 
From the previous welfare analysis, the smuggling of 
television sets is found to have worsening effect on 
economic open areas in China. Since in recent years, 
television set is the most typical type of smuggled 
commodities, its welfare implication is suggestive of the 
general welfare impact from smuggling, i.e. smuggling is 
likely not to be beneficial to China economy, if not 
harmful. Consumers in China seem to have little gain from 
the price disparity as it happens to be too small in the 
case of smuggling television sets. 
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Apparently, Chinese government succeeds in 
maintaining its target price for imported goods before 
1991. The trade-off is the net loss in the private 
sectors. 
As we know, China's development strategy is exports-
oriented. Trade barriers are essential in protecting 
infant industry. From communists‘ angle, present 
consumption is always needed to be scarified for future 
development. Equity judgement always questions the idea of 
substitution of present wealth by future wealth. But with 
the uneven income distribution in the present economic 
development environment in China, the sudden sharp rise in 
wealth of high income group causes a surge in the demand 
for foreign luxury goods. If imports demand is not 
restricted, only a few people is better off at the expense 
of the development of infant industries. Smuggling will be 
harmful under this consideration. Trade barriers, and 
smuggling as a consequence, are likely to exist in the 
near future. 
However, not only the imports of final products but 
also intermediate products is restricted. From recent 
reports mona Kona Economic Journal, July 29, 1993), the 
quality of domestic output is still far below foreign 
standard. The excuse may be the deep-rooted institutional 
inefficiency in domestic enterprises. Another reasons will 
be the trade barriers imposed on intermediate products 
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which hinders the technology imports. Smuggling of this 
products is reported in few years ago. (Pai Shing Semi-
monthly- 1991:239, pp.30-31) This type of smuggling seems 
to be beneficial if it can reach the objective of 
technology transfer. In recent years, a successive cut 
down and a significant drop in tariff rate on these 
products are carried out. This shows that Chinese 
government has corrected her strategy on restricting 
imports of intermediate products. Smuggling of this types 
of goods will decrease. 
Smuggling is an alternative way of re-exports in 
Hongkong. It has been shown that smuggling plays an 
important role in Hongkong economy. However, it does not 
mean that smuggling is beneficial to Hongkong. First of 
all, the smuggled goods from Hongkong are sometimes 
exchanged for drugs and fire arms. With the inflow of 
these things, the order of Hongkong society will be 
disturbed. Moreover, smuggling will involve the theft of 
property. Stolen cars is a good example to illustrate 
that smuggling incurs loss to Hongkong economy. Finally, 
smuggling does not necessarily facilitate trade with 
China. If the finding in previous analysis is accepted 
without any question, non-smuggling may imply larger 
imports demand than smuggling (since net loss is found in 
1988 to 1990 from the analysis). Hongkong will trade more 
with China through legal channels under non-smuggling. 
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In conclusion, the empirical works in this thesis 
provide a way to analyze the welfare impact. Although 
there is great difficulty in estimation for Chinese import 
demand, such as its erratic demand and insufficiency of 
data, it can act an illustrative example for welfare 
comparison. Much better result about the welfare impact of 
smuggling is expected if more data is available. 
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An indirect way to obtain the black market exchangre rate 
Recall equations 5.8a and 5.8b: 
-(1-r)、eB-eo、=。/⑷） 
e。 
(1-r)、eB-eo) =。/⑷）+ ^ 
Combining the two equations gives: 
( 九 1) C^O^) + = -1 
Assume that the marginal risk costs is a linear function 
of extent of misinvoicing. Then the marginal risk costs 
can be estimated by regressing on tariff rate. With the 
estimates of marginal risks costs, the black market 
exchange rate can be predicted by equation (A.l), with 
known retention rate and official exchange rate. 
P r a c t i c a l l y , time series data of a traded commodity can be 
used for estimation if constant risk costs over time is 
a s s u m e d . O t h e r w i s e , cross-sectional data will be used 
under the assumption of identical risk costs across 
sections of commodities. 
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A little modificafir.r. • 
- - - - - b e f o r e , ： for - e s t 聰 _ 
e x p i a t o r y for t ^ 賺^ satisfactory 
than e. Then th m 吨 細 1 risk 
en the equations changes to: 
r r 一 " c 一 t i o … n still be 一 , 
linear t。 Linear regression .e.a.ns a 
convenient way for estimation of marginal , 
the black market arginahisks c ^ s _ 
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Appendix B 
Suppose that it is impossible to solve the imports 
demand function directly to get and However, they 
can be solved by a recursive calculation method. Let use 
the computation of welfare loss as an example. (See Fig. 
B.l.) 
、广 
Y^ 小 个 V� 
V 、々、 4,丨竹） Y' Y V V丨 \ \ V \ \ 
1 \ 丨 丨 A 丸 , 计 ） 
« ^ > M ^ ^ M 
We firstly add back the smuggling costs, C, to the 
national income (the new income is then Y^) and get the 
corresponding import demand, M、 
(B.l) + ) Inhere = + C 
Then we found that with income the economy will 
demand for M^ amount of import. But from Fig. B.l, they 
only need to pay the amount for the additional 
import, instead of the amount P^(l+t) . Then the 
economy will have the gain which is equal to . 
Adding this to the national income will have a 
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corresponding demand on import, M^ 
^(1 + t) ) where = 
= 7° + C+tp "m1-mo) 
We find that when this process continues, the 
national income will be increasing until the further 
increase of import demand between each generation 
converses to zero. Then the national income with the non-
smuggling, Y^, can be found. 
m3 二 厂 f (1 + t) ) where = + ^ {M^-M^) 
MT = F[YT,pf[i + t:)、where Y? = tp ^  (M^-^-M^-^) 
二 yr-i 
. , M T - 1 — MT々 二 0 
However, in order to achieve the convergence of Y^, 
there must exist some restrictions on the parameters of 
the function. The most important factor affecting this 
problem is the income elasticity of the commodity 
imported. If the imported commodity is very elastic, the 
raise of income will result in much more import. In 
return, the exports must increase which will lead to much 
larger national income so that income will approach 
154. 
i n f i n i t y B u t in reality, it cannot happen. Either the 
income elasticity will decreases with increasing demand or 
the free trade price will finally increase. Thus if we 
assume that it is a small economy, under the condition 
that the free trade price will not be altered, the 
elasticity will be under some restriction to achieve 
satisfactory result. 
Now, let us assume that the import demand has 
constant elasticity of income, e. Since, 
= A M / M 
AY/Y 
\ C+AMp ft AM 
=> e — — 二 
yO M 。 
=> eM。C+eAMM。_p ft 二 r。AM 
=> A M = — 
yO-eM。p ft 
As AM = mt _ therefore, 
(B.2) MT - 0 •。。f + MO 
Let e be positive. We find that for the convergence 
the economy will spend all her income 
i^ hfr二工器ullr goods. The income will be bounded by the 
on this p^rt^icu丄 y possible for an economy to consume 
二3二ifon i^orts But spen^ding all the income on a particular 
goods seems to be unimaginable. 
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of yt and mt, it must satisfy the following condition. 
(B.3) Y'-eM'p^t > 0 
=> > eM°p ^ t 
From equation B.2, with larger the income elasticity, e, 
mt will be larger. Since higher imports demand will 
consequently lead to higher exports which stimulate higher 
national income if trade deficit is not allowed (under 
general equilibrium) . If e is. too large that the above 
expression (yo—eMOpft) is smaller than zero, aM will be 
negative. It is not possible to have decreasing demand for 
increasing income if income elasticity is positive. Thus 
this means that Y"^  and M^ will not converge. 
If the above happens, increasing the income (adding 
back the smuggling costs) will generate larger imports 
demand and then further increase in income. To reach 
equilibrium with the violation of inequality B.3, either 
corner solution or shrink of imports will be the result. 
If imports demand decreases, income will decrease (e 〉 0) 
-or increase (e < 0). See Fig. B.2 . E^ i and Et2 in Fig. B.2 
are the equilibrium positions when income decreases and 
increases respectively. But since e is positive, import 
demand will decrease only when income decreases. Therefore 
E will not be the possible equilibrium position for 
T2 
positive income elasticity. For E^i, it is quite strange 
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that the national income will decrease because it will 
violate the mechanism of the consumption choice, i.e., 
consumption decreases when MRS larger than relative price 
at point B in Fig. B.3 . Thus this type of equilibrium is 
not feasible and therefore rejected. 
M &, (ietH“》^l hr 
rA丁 … ） ⑷ ⑷ M b M I 
( % 〔 ％ 、 / U ) I 
I 
The remaining case will be corner solution. But with 
its exploding trade volume, it is believably that the free 
trade price will increase as a result. Moreover, it will 
be impossible for an economy to spend all their income on 
imported goods. In addition, before adding back the 
smuggling costs, the equilibrium will not be stable as 
little derivation will cause either zero import or 
spending totally on imports. Therefore, if the estimates 
of income elasticity is so large that Y^ and M^ do not 
converge, the estimation for the income elasticity is 
considered to be failure. 
Thus, we believe that the elasticity will not always 
be constant. Finally it will decrease and lead to 
1 5 7 
convergence. 
With varying elasticity with income, the requirement 
for the elasticity will somewhat similar. For the first 
generation, 
A = AAfi 
二 C 
A _ A M I 
A 1 e^M^C 
yO 
1 0 eoM。c 二 〉 + — 
For the second generation, 
A = y2 _ yi —Ml 
二 tp f AMI 
A 一 A M 2 
�e . M ^ A Y ^ =y 
yi 
_ e^M^ tp ^ AM^ 
=> m2= M^+AM^ 二 ——— 
= + — " " “ • - ) 
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For the third generation, 
A = — y2 AM^ -
- =tp ^AM^ 
。A AM^ e, = 
一 e^M^ tp ^ Am^ 
=> m3 = M^+AM^ 
= 
yl 
e^M^p ^ tAM^ + 
。 , 1 f tAMi 
+ 
。 ^ 1 , e.M^p ft 
e.M^p " t ft \ + ) 
With further generation, 
� A 1 , e.M^p ft , e.M^p ft、，e^M^p ^t 
Y^ yl Y 
I e^M^p ft) ( e^M^p ft:) ( e^M^p ^t ) + ) 
• YL YL y3 
二 ) 
in which, ip〜亡 
1 




Let - iV 
乂 + A 靠 阶 购 
= , � 
If (*) is finite, mt must be finite. Thus if R随 is smaller 
than one, it will be a sufficient condition for M^ to be 
finite. Thus it requires that: 
< 1 => i^j < 1 for i=l,2,3 T 
...i^ ax = 
R^ < 1 
\ e土M土p ft 
二 〉 ： < 1 y ^  
=> e.M^p ^ t < Y 土 
土 = 1,2,3, T 
Since R^ is: 
Y 土 > e土Mipft 
-〉Y —— 〉 — Mip ft 
Y^ Ml 
= > AAP、ipft = 
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This means that the elasticity must be small enough that 
the next generation of income must be smaller than the 
previous stage. 
Therefore, in order to achieve the computable welfare 
change in empirical work, income elasticity is a critical 
factor, regardless varying or constant income elasticity 
is assumed. This also applies for the welfare gain by 
price disparity in smuggling, as both the computation is 
done by the same mechanism. 
In applying the above method for our welfare 
analysis, the income elasticity requirement for 
convergence of imports demand can rarely be violated. It 
is because when only one type of smuggling commodity is 
studied, the induced reduction/addition effect on income 
is very small comparing with the national income, as its 
trade volume is incomparable to both the total trade 
volume and national income. It will only be a problem when 
the aggregate foreign trade is used as the studying target 
of smuggling. 
Once the requirement for income elasticity is 
guaranteed, if smuggling lead to a net welfare gain to the 
economy, the consumption choice, E,., along the line ZZ (see 
Fig. B.4) will never fall in the region ZZ^. Recall that we 
have let G be the initial impact of price disparity in 
C h a p t e r 4. By drawing a h y p o t h e t i c a l line p a r a l l e l to t h e 
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terms of trade through point E^ .,, removing G will give a 
similar impact on the economy as if removing C in 
analyzing the loss from smuggling. If Eg,, falls in the 
region ZZj^ , such as point D in which G will be smaller than 
C, it will violate our previous requirement for income 
elasticity. (Comparing point D and E^, their relative 
position is similar to the relative position of E。 and 
point C (a Y<0) in Fig. B.3. Recall that even when final 
demand for import decline, the possibility for income to 
decline is rejected as it violate the mechanism of 
consumer choice. ) G must be larger than C. If smuggling 
lead to a net welfare loss, G must be smaller than C. 
Therefore, we can simply compare G and C to draw 
conclusion on the direction of the welfare impact of 
smuggling (i.e., whether there is welfare improvement or 
worsening) but not its magnitude. and M^ are required to 
calculate the amount of net gain/loss. Then in the 
empirical study, we assume that income elasticity of the 
imports demand can satisfy the above requirement. 
So far we have only consider the case with positive 
income elasticity. If income elasticity is negative, 
import demand will always decline when income decreases 
and vice versa. The new equilibrium position will always 
be bounded in the region YY in Fig. B.5. Since the 
equilibrium position will not occurr in region XX, E^ ,, will 
also not fall in the region ZZ, in Fig. B.4. Therefore, 
simply comparing C and G for welfare analysis is still 
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valid when income elasticity is negative. 
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